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THE DESTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY OF FEDERAL PROXY
ACCESS
Jill E. Fisch*
ABSTRACT
After almost seventy years of debate, on August 25, 2010, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a federal proxy access rule. The
D.C. Circuit promptly invalidated the new rule before it ever went into effect.
This Article examines the ill-fated rule and concludes that, although the D.C.
Circuit did not identify its flaws, the rule was ambiguous in its application and
unlikely to increase shareholder input into the composition of corporate
boards. More troubling was the SEC’s ambiguous justification for its rule,
which was neither grounded in state law nor premised on a normative vision of
the appropriate role of shareholder nominations in corporate governance.
Although the federal proxy access rule in its current form is now dead, had
it gone into effect, its practical significance would have been minimal. The
SEC’s ambiguous approach to proxy access, an approach that significantly
predates its adoption of Rule 14a-11, is particularly problematic because its
rules continue to burden issuer-specific innovations in nominating procedures.
The SEC has acknowledged this criticism but has refused to remove existing
regulatory burdens.
The core of the problem, as illustrated by the SEC’s experience with proxy
access, is that federal regulation is poorly suited for regulating corporate
governance. Private ordering offers a more flexible mechanism for
maintaining equilibrium in the allocation of power between shareholders and
managers. Absent federal regulatory interference, existing state law permits
issuer-specific innovation regarding the shareholder role in nominating
director candidates. This Article concludes by outlining the federal regulatory
changes necessary to enable effective private ordering.

* Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I presented earlier drafts of
this Article to New York University’s Topics in U.S. and Global Business Regulation seminar, the Brooklyn
Law School Faculty Workshop, and the Center in Law, Economics, and Organization Workshop at the
University of Southern California Gould School of Law, and received many helpful suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
Under U.S. corporate law, the shareholders elect the board of directors.1 In
most cases, however, those shareholders do not nominate director candidates.
Instead, the nominating committee of the board chooses a slate of candidates,
and those candidates are submitted to the shareholders for approval.2 Absent
the infrequent phenomenon of an election contest,3 shareholders do not
participate in the nomination process.4

1 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2001) (“[A]n annual meeting of stockholders shall be held
for the election of directors . . . .”).
2 See Order Approving NYSE and NASD Proposed Rule Changes and Amendments Relating to
Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,177 (Nov. 4, 2003)
(approving a New York Stock Exchange rule change requiring listed issuers to have an independent
nominating committee).
3 See Lee Harris, Missing in Activism: Retail Investor Absence in Corporate Elections, 2010 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 104, 120–21 (summarizing several reports on the frequency of contested elections and finding
that, over the time period from 1996 to 2008, the number of contested elections at public companies averaged
around thirty-six per year).
4 Election contests, in which a challenger files a separate proxy card and conducts an independent
solicitation, generally involve a substantial shareholder that is either seeking control of the company or
seeking, through board representation, to effect a change in corporate strategy. See CHRIS CERNICH ET AL.,
IRRC INST., EFFECTIVENESS OF HYBRID BOARDS 7–11 (2009), available at http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/
IRRC_05_09_EffectiveHybridBoards.pdf (describing how hedge funds use partial board representation to
attempt to change corporate strategy). Few election contests are premised on differences in directors’
personalities as opposed to the policies they propose to implement. Cf. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine &
Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955) (distinguishing between election contests premised on
policy disagreements and those based on personal issues).
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has struggled for years to
regulate the shareholders’ role in nominating directors.5 As early as 1942, the
SEC proposed a rule that would have required issuers to include shareholdernominated candidates in their proxy statements.6 Ultimately, the SEC
abandoned the proposal. In the ensuing almost-seventy years, the SEC
revisited the issue at least five times but failed to adopt a rule allowing proxy
access.7
Adoption of a shareholder nomination rule faced several obstacles. First,
from the outset, the rule faced strong opposition from business interests.
Indeed, measured by the number of comment letters, proxy access is, by far,
the SEC’s most controversial rule-making initiative.8 Second, as the SEC
refined the federal proxy rules in response to ongoing marketplace
developments, the details of a proxy access rule became both increasingly
important and impossible to perfect. Fundamentally, the SEC was unable to
draft a proxy access rule that would satisfy everyone. Third, the D.C. Circuit

5 State corporation law, rather than federal securities regulation, is the source of any shareholder power
to nominate director candidates. Since the 1930s, however, the federal proxy rules have regulated the
procedures and disclosures associated with shareholder voting and the solicitation of proxies. See Jill E. Fisch,
From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1130–31 (1993).
Although the federal rules ostensibly do not modify shareholders’ substantive voting rights, as a practical
matter, federal regulation has substantially limited the exercise of those rights. Id. at 1134 (“[T]he SEC has
affirmatively impeded the effectiveness of the shareholder voting process . . . .”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking
the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path
Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1087 (2008) (“[T]he use by stockholders of their state law rights had been
stymied by the SEC itself . . . .”).
6 Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, Holding Company Act Release No.
3988, Investment Company Act Release No. 417, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942).
7 See DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, 96TH CONG., STAFF REP. ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 29–32
(Comm. Print 1980) (describing task-force and public hearings on proxy access in the late 1970s); Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9046, Exchange Act Release No. 60,089,
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,765, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274) [hereinafter Proposing Release] (proposing a proxy access rule);
Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,913, 72
Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,472 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposing a rule that
would allow 5% shareholders to propose proxy access bylaw amendments); Security Holder Director
Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg.
60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274) (proposing a proxy access
rule); Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326, Investment
Company Act Release No. 19,031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,288 (Oct. 22, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 249) (considering a universal ballot as part of proposed amendments to the bona fide nominee rule).
8 See Broc Romanek, Doing the Math: How Many Proxy Access Comment Letters This Decade?,
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET BLOG (Feb. 12, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/Blog/
2010/02/math-of-comment-letters.html (stating that the SEC had received almost 52,000 comment letters on
proxy access as of February 2010). It should be noted that many of these were duplicate or form letters. Id.
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declared in its 1990 decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC that the SEC
lacked the authority to regulate corporate governance through the proxy rules.9
A shareholder nomination rule was likely to raise a potential conflict with this
holding and to trigger litigation seeking to invalidate the rule.10
When Congress authorized the SEC to adopt a federal proxy access rule as
part of the Dodd–Frank financial regulatory reforms,11 it removed the last of
these hurdles, clearing the way for the SEC both to adopt proxy access and,
more importantly, to consider explicitly the corporate governance implications
of increasing shareholder access to the proxy. Yet Rule 14a-11,12 the SEC’s
proxy access rule, adopted on August 25, 2010, when the ink on Dodd–Frank
was barely dry,13 was limited in scope and ambiguous in both its application
and its justification. Indeed, once Congress authorized the SEC’s adoption of
proxy access, the SEC’s most significant change to its prior proposals was to
tighten the qualification requirements, sharply limiting the number of
shareholders that would be able to use the rule.
Although the SEC described the proxy access rule as “facilitat[ing] the
rights of shareholders to nominate directors to a company’s board,”14 it failed
to do so. The restrictive limitations on which shareholders qualify to use the
rule, coupled with new and existing burdens on shareholder collective action,
suggested that the rule would be a nonstarter, ineffective in enabling
shareholders even to exercise their nominating power, much less to affect
board composition or increase director accountability. In addition, the SEC
battened down the hatches with respect to state law and private ordering efforts
9

See 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
See Letter from Henry A. McKinnell, Chairman, Bus. Roundtable, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 4–
6 (Dec. 22, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-381.pdf (arguing that the
1990 Business Roundtable decision limited the SEC’s power to regulating disclosures, not corporate
governance).
11 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat.
1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010)).
12 Rule 14a-11 was reserved from the 2010 Code of Federal Regulations pending litigation over its
validity in the D.C. Circuit. After the rule was invalidated in Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C.
Cir. 2011), the 2011 Code of Federal Regulations omitted the rule entirely. The rule as it was adopted can be
found at Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act
Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,677–93 (Sept. 16,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) [hereinafter Adopting Release]. The remainder of
this Article will refer to the final rule as released in the Federal Register.
13 President Obama signed the Dodd–Frank Act into law on July 21, 2010. Overhaul Forces Loan
Wording Change, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2011, at 8.
14 Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts New Measures to Facilitate Director Nominations by Shareholders
(Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-155.htm.
10
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to facilitate shareholder nominating power. Although it purported to leave
issuers the option of further extending shareholder nominating rights, the new
rule burdened the use of issuer-specific alternatives to it—even though recent
amendments to the Delaware statute explicitly authorized issuers to establish
shareholder nominating procedures.15
When the D.C. Circuit invalidated Rule 14a-11,16 it removed a largely
ineffective tool for shareholder nomination of directors but not the preexisting
and continuing burdens on private ordering. Existing SEC rules continue to
impose extensive regulatory requirements on the exercise of shareholder
nomination rights and to frustrate shareholder efforts to enhance those rights
through state law mechanisms.
Regardless of whether one supports shareholder nomination of directors,
the Rule 14a-11 experience raises a puzzle. If the SEC intended to facilitate
shareholder nomination of directors, why did it adopt a rule that largely
insulates issuers from shareholder input into the selection of director
candidates? If, instead, the SEC determined that increasing shareholder
nominating power was a bad idea, why go through the pretense of adopting a
proxy access rule at all? More broadly, the SEC’s rule-making releases offer
no insight into the SEC’s normative position as to whether proxy access will
improve the corporate governance of public companies. Absent such
justification, the exercise of rule-making authority appeared disturbingly
arbitrary. Yet the D.C. Circuit appeared untroubled by these deficiencies and,
instead, took the unprecedented approach of second-guessing the conclusions
of the SEC’s economic analysis.
This Article explores the destructive ambiguity of federal proxy access. It
demonstrates the tension between the federal requirements for the exercise of
shareholder nominating rights and the state law principles upon which the SEC
purported to ground those rights. It unpacks the ambiguities in the SEC’s
conception of which shareholders should nominate director candidates. And it
reveals the ambiguity resulting from the SEC’s failure to confront, in adopting
its rule, the appropriate allocation of power between shareholders and
management, and the effects of proxy access on that balance. Ironically, these
deficiencies highlight the advantages provided by state law regulation of
corporate governance and strengthen the case for implementing shareholder
nominating procedures through private ordering.
15
16

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (Supp. 2011) (authorizing issuers to adopt proxy access bylaws).
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d at 1146.
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Because it is important to consider Rule 14a-11 in its historical context,
Part I of this Article briefly recounts the history of federal proxy access. In Part
II, the Article describes the major features of Rule 14a-11, the SEC’s
accompanying changes to Rule 14a-8, and the subsequent history of the rules,
including the D.C. Circuit’s decision. Part III identifies the SEC’s ambiguous
rationale for adopting a federal proxy access rule. In Part IV, the Article
situates proxy access within the broader context of corporate governance and
demonstrates how latent ambiguity in the appropriate allocation of power
within the corporate structure and the inability of a mandatory federal rule to
adjust as necessary to maintain a stable equilibrium render a federal standard
inferior to state law and private ordering.17 Part V proposes an alternative
regulatory approach designed to facilitate such private ordering.
The existing political climate makes it unlikely that the SEC will propose a
revised proxy access rule, at least in the short term, and the revisions to the
Delaware statute and Rule 14a-8 provide, at least nominally, the opportunity
for shareholders to experiment with proxy access through private ordering. As
described in this Article, however, federal law continues to impede such
experimentation. With the invalidation of Rule 14a-11, adoption of the reforms
advocated in Part V of this Article to remove such impediments becomes
increasingly important.
I. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL PROXY ACCESS
The tepid support offered by the SEC for proxy access and the limited
scope of Rule 14a-11 are particularly surprising in light of the rule’s long
gestation period. The SEC has been considering proxy access for almost
seventy years. Indeed, the SEC first considered a rule that would have required
issuers to include shareholder-nominated director candidates on the proxy
statement in 1942.18 This consideration was part of the rule-making process
that resulted in the adoption of the shareholder proposal rule, now Rule 14a8—rule making that resulted from the changes to the proxy solicitation process
17 This Article uses the term private ordering to describe issuer-specific corporate governance
provisions, as distinguished from corporate law rules established by statute or regulation. Such governance
provisions are contractual in nature and typically take the form of a charter or bylaw provision, although they
may alternatively be embodied in a traditional contract. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 898 A.2d 344, 345–
46 (Del. Ch. 2006) (describing an agreement between a board and a corporation’s shareholders regarding the
board’s power to adopt a poison pill); D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 n.12 (2011) (discussing various uses of the term private ordering).
18 See Jill E. Fisch, The Transamerica Case, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 46, 63 (Jonathan
R. Macey ed., 2008) (describing the 1942 rule proposal).
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that reduced in-person attendance at shareholder meetings.19 Although the SEC
adopted a requirement that issuers include shareholder proposals in the proxy
statement, the SEC abandoned the provision addressing shareholder
nominations in the face of substantial opposition by corporate management.20
Subsequently, the SEC revised the shareholder proposal rule to preclude
proposals relating to director elections. As time went on, the SEC’s
interpretations of this exclusion became increasingly restrictive, leading the
SEC to authorize the exclusion of proposals that nominated or advocated the
election of a particular director, as well as proposals that addressed director
qualifications or election procedures more generally.21
Investors repeatedly challenged the SEC’s restrictive approach to
shareholder voting and urged the SEC to reverse its position. In 1977, the SEC
established a task force to undertake a comprehensive review of the federal
proxy rules.22 As part of the review process, the SEC held a series of public
hearings in which it received testimony and submissions from a wide variety of
constituents concerning the nomination process.23 Critics of shareholder
nominations, primarily corporate management, testified that the use of
nominating committees would adequately address any perceived problems
about the director nomination process.24 At the conclusion of the process, the
SEC did not propose a shareholder nomination rule.25 Instead, as the SEC task
force reported to the Senate, due to the emergence of nominating committees, a
shareholder nomination rule was unnecessary.26
In response to continued investor complaints, the SEC undertook another
“comprehensive review” of the proxy rules in 1990.27 Following two years of
study, the SEC adopted a variety of controversial rule changes designed to
19 Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, Holding Company Act Release No.
3988, Investment Company Act Release No. 417, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942).
20 Fisch, supra note 5, at 1163.
21 Fisch, supra note 18, at 63–64.
22 See DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, STAFF REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS REGARDING THE
NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 3 n.10 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
proxyreport.pdf (describing the SEC’s consideration of proxy access in 1977).
23 See DIV. OF CORP. FIN., supra note 7, at 29–30.
24 Id. at 122–27.
25 In response to the task force report, the SEC developed three proposals, two of which would have
substantially reduced the SEC’s role in regulating shareholder access to the ballot. Fisch, supra note 5, at 1165
n.169. The SEC did not adopt these proposals. Id.
26 DIV. OF CORP. FIN., supra note 7, at 122–27.
27 See Fisch, supra note 5, at 1165–66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing concerns leading up
to the SEC’s 1990 review of the proxy rules).
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reduce the “chilling effect” and costs associated with shareholder participation
in the proxy solicitation process.28 Despite proposals for a universal ballot that
would have facilitated investor choice among competing slates of candidates,
the SEC did not adopt such a proposal, nor did it adopt a shareholder
nomination rule.29
Finally, in the wake of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 200230 and the wave of
corporate governance scandals that precipitated its adoption,31 the SEC
returned to the subject of proxy access. In May 2003, the SEC solicited public
comment on its review of the proxy rules relating to the nomination and
election of directors.32 Several months later, the SEC proposed a proxy access
rule.33
The proposed rule, in general terms, would have allowed shareholders that
had held at least 5% of the company’s stock for at least two years34 to
nominate from one to three director candidates, but only upon the occurrence
of a triggering event.35 Triggering events included one or more directors
receiving a 35% withhold vote, submission of a direct access proposal by
holders of at least 1% of the issuer’s stock and approval of the proposal by a
majority of votes cast, and, possibly, the issuer’s failure to adopt a shareholder
resolution or proposal that had received majority approval.36

28

See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326,
Investment Company Act Release No. 19,031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,279 (Oct. 22, 1992) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
29 See id. at 48,287–89.
30 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
31 Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 923, 924–25
(2010) (describing frauds at Enron and WorldCom as the most prominent examples of these scandals).
32 Notice of Solicitation of Public Views Regarding Possible Changes to the Proxy Rules, Exchange Act
No. 47,778, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,530 (May 7, 2003).
33 Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,784–85 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
240, 249, 274). The rule was explicitly subject to state corporate law provisions concerning shareholder
nomination rights. Id. at 60,808. In particular, the SEC noted that, to the extent that state law permitted a
corporation to prohibit shareholder nominations through provisions in its charter or bylaws, the proposed
proxy access procedure would not be available to shareholders of corporations choosing to do so. Id.
34 Id. at 60,806. Where multiple shareholders were eligible to use the rule, the company would only be
required to include the nominee(s) of the shareholder with the largest stake in the company. Id. at 60,798.
35 Id. at 60,789, 60,797. The proposed rule also included various disclosure and independence
requirements, including a requirement that the nominee be independent of the nominating shareholder. Id. at
60,795–96. The independence requirement provided, inter alia, that a natural person could not nominate
himself and that an entity could not nominate a current or former employee. Id. at 60,796.
36 See id. at 60,789–91 (describing triggering events).
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As proposed, the extent to which Rule 14a-11 would have resulted in the
inclusion of shareholder-nominated directors was unclear. With respect to the
triggering conditions, the SEC found, in a study of director elections over the
preceding two years, that roughly 1.1% of companies had total withhold votes
in excess of 35% of the votes cast.37 The SEC also observed that 84% of
companies listed on an exchange or NASDAQ had a least one shareholder that
would have been eligible to submit a proxy access resolution.38 According to
the SEC, in the event proxy access was triggered, 42% of filers had at least one
shareholder that, individually, met the necessary ownership requirements to
nominate a director candidate, and 18% had two or more such shareholders.39
The SEC did not provide information about the characteristics of these
shareholders that might provide a basis for assessing whether they would be
likely to nominate a director. Based on this data, the SEC estimated that the
proxy access rule would be triggered annually in seventy-three companies and
that, in forty-five of these companies, at least one shareholder would make a
nomination.40
Although the SEC’s estimates may have been overly generous and, even
under those estimates, shareholder nominations under the proposed rule were
unlikely to occur frequently,41 business interests mounted substantial
opposition to the proposal. A total of 504 individuals and entities submitted
comments on the proposal,42 and an additional 185 comments were

37

Id. at 60,790.
See id. (observing that 84% of these companies had at least one shareholder that owned at least 1% of
the outstanding shares for at least one year).
39 Id. at 60,794.
40 Id. at 60,810. These estimates were made as part of the SEC’s analysis under the Paperwork Reduction
Act. Id. at 60,807. The SEC conceded that “there is no reliable way to predict how many more security holder
proposals would be submitted based on the proposed amendments, how often the events would be triggered or
how many security holders would be able to meet the applicable requirements (e.g., minimum ownership
threshold).” Id. at 60,811.
41 In 2002, the SEC indicated that there were approximately 9400 reporting issuers. See Acceleration of
Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning Web Site Access to Reports, Securities Act Release
No. 8128, Exchange Act Release No. 46,464, 67 Fed. Reg. 58,480, 58,489 n.95 (Sept. 16, 2002) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 240, 249). By 2006, that number had increased to almost 12,000. See
Smaller Reporting Company Regulatory Relief and Simplification, Securities Act Release No. 8876, Exchange
Act Release No. 56,994, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2451, 73 Fed. Reg. 934, 935 (Jan. 4, 2008) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249, 260, 269).
42 Summary of Comments: In Response to the Commission’s Proposed Rules Relating to Security Holder
Director Nominations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 5, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/
s71903summary.htm [hereinafter Summary of Comments].
38

FISCH GALLEYSFINAL

444

5/1/2012 7:46 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:435

subsequently submitted in response to an additional solicitation of comments.43
As the SEC explained in its summary, most of those supporting the proposal
favored a stronger rule—one providing greater proxy access rights.44
Corporations, corporate executives, and corporate directors, however, “were
nearly unanimous in their opposition to the proposed rules.”45 Faced with this
business opposition, coupled with claims that any consideration of shareholder
nomination should be deferred pending an assessment of the impact of
Sarbanes–Oxley, Chairman Donaldson abandoned the proposal.46
The SEC’s decision not to mandate proxy access in 2003 might have laid
the issue to rest, but institutional investors were not satisfied. Having failed to
persuade the SEC to adopt proxy access, they sought, through private ordering,
to implement proxy access procedures at individual issuers.47 In 2006, the
Second Circuit upheld an effort by the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), a union pension fund, to submit a
proxy access bylaw for a vote by AIG shareholders.48 The decision, by holding
that Rule 14a-8 permitted the submission of proxy access bylaws,49 opened the
door for investors to establish issuer-specific procedures for shareholder
participation in the nominating process.50
The SEC promptly closed the door on these private ordering efforts.
Expressing concern that the decision would lead to “uncertainty and
confusion” in the upcoming proxy season and that proxy access bylaw
amendments could result in contested director elections that did not comport
with the disclosure requirements applicable to election contests, the SEC

43 DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, FILE NO. S7-19-03, SUPPLEMENTAL SUMMARY OF COMMENTS RECEIVED ON
AFTER FEBRUARY 6, 2004: IN RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSED RULES RELATING TO SECURITY
HOLDER DIRECTOR NOMINATIONS 3–8 (2004).
44 Id. at 9–10 (“[M]ore than half the Supporting Commenters desired a stronger rule.”).
45 Summary of Comments, supra note 42.
46 Gretchen Morgenson, All’s Not Lost, Disgruntled Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at B1
(explaining that corporate lobbying “helped to defeat” the 2003 proxy access proposal).
47 See Fisch, supra note 18, at 66 (describing issuer efforts to obtain proxy access through bylaw
amendment proposals in the wake of the failed 2003 proposal).
48 AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2006).
49 Id.
50 The court noted that the SEC was free, however, to change the scope of the election exclusion. See id.
at 130 n.9 (“[I]f the SEC determines that the interpretation of the election exclusion embodied in its 1976
Statement would result in a decrease in necessary disclosures or any other undesirable outcome, it can
certainly change its interpretation of the election exclusion, provided that it explains its reasons for doing so.”).
OR
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reopened the issue of proxy access.51 The SEC proposed two alternatives. The
first alternative would have authorized large shareholders that satisfied certain
conditions to propose proxy access procedures through bylaw amendments.52
The second alternative proposed codifying the position that the SEC had
advocated in AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., authorizing issuers to exclude shareholder
nomination bylaw proposals.53 On December 6, 2007, the SEC adopted the
latter alternative, overturning the court’s decision in AFSCME.54
The 2007 amendment, which precluded shareholders from establishing
nominating procedures on an issuer-specific basis through private ordering,
was the most restrictive approach to shareholder nomination that the SEC had
ever taken. President Obama’s election and his subsequent appointment of
Mary Schapiro to serve as the new Chair of the SEC made proxy access appear
more likely. In her confirmation hearings, Schapiro pledged to give large
shareholders more say in the selection of corporate directors.55
Subsequently, on June 10, 2009, the SEC introduced another proxy access
proposal.56 The proposal contained two components. First, the SEC proposed a
revised version of Rule 14a-11 that would have authorized shareholders that
owned from 1% to 5% of the issuer’s stock (depending on the size of the
issuer) for at least a year to nominate candidates for up to 25% of the board of
directors.57 Although the proposal required shareholder candidates to meet
applicable standards of independence,58 it eliminated the requirement of a
triggering event59 and the limitations on relationships between the candidate

51 Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,161,
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488, 43,491 (proposed July 27, 2007) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
52 Id. at 43,470 (proposing a rule allowing shareholders that held at least 5% of the company’s stock for
at least a year and who had filed a 13G in addition to making a variety of further disclosures to propose a
proxy access bylaw amendment). The proposed rule did not seek to dictate any specific procedures or
qualifications for proxy access.
53 Id. at 43,493.
54 Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,914,
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,075, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240).
55 Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Pick Pledges to Ratchet Up Oversight, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2009, at D1.
56 Proposing Release, supra note 7.
57 Id. at 29,032–44. The rule proposed to allow shareholders to nominate one director candidate or 25%
of the board’s directors, whichever was greater. Id. at 29,043. Where multiple qualifying shareholders sought
to nominate director candidates, the company would only be required to include those candidates from the first
nominating shareholder or group. Id. at 29,044.
58 Id. at 29,040–42.
59 Id. at 29,032 (“Today’s proposal does not require a triggering event.”).
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and the nominating shareholder that had been part of the 2003 proposed rule.60
The rule also required new disclosures on proposed Schedule 14N—
disclosures that the SEC described as “substantially similar” to those proposed
in 2003.61
Second, the SEC proposed amending Rule 14a-8 to permit shareholder
proposals concerning nomination procedures or disclosures as long as the
proposals did not conflict with proposed Rule 14a-11.62 The amendment would
have treated such proposals similarly to all other shareholder proposals—
proposing shareholders would have been required to hold a minimum of $2000
worth of stock for at least a year63 and would not have been required to make
any mandated disclosures or filings.64 The SEC explained that this proposal,
which essentially reversed its 2007 rule change, was feasible in light of the fact
that any issuer-specific shareholder nomination process would now be subject
to mandated disclosure under new Rule 14a-19, which included the
requirement that a nominating shareholder file a Schedule 14N.65
The SEC received 537 comments in the initial sixty-day comment period.66
Some of these comments provided data and analysis suggesting that the SEC’s
review had been incomplete. As a result, in December 2009, the SEC reopened
the comment period for an additional thirty days, specifically inviting the
public to comment on this additional material.67 Approximately sixty
comments were submitted during this additional period.68

60

Id. at 29,041.
Id. at 29,045–46. The SEC described Schedule 14N as requiring “disclosure similar to what would be
obtained in an election contest.” Id. at 29,046.
62 Id. at 29,056.
63 Id. at 29,056 n.256.
64 Id. at 29,056.
65 See id. at 29,056–58.
66 J.G. Ballard, Regulatory Watch: SEC Extends Comment Period for Proposed Director Nomination
Rule, BUS. L. CURRENTS (Dec. 15, 2009), http://currents.westlawbusiness.com/Articles/2009/12/20091215_
0022.aspx?cid=&src=E100629001&sp=.
67 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9086, Exchange Act
Release No. 61,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,069, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,144, 67,145 (proposed
Dec. 14, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274) (referencing four documents
containing such data and analysis and included in the public comment file).
68 Comments on Proposed Rule: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009.shtml (last modified Nov. 1, 2010) (listing and
providing links to submitted comments and including approximately sixty comments submitted after
December 2009).
61
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As indicated above, commentators have repeatedly questioned the authority
of the SEC to mandate proxy access.69 With the adoption of the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act70 on July 15, 2010,71
Congress addressed these concerns. The new legislation explicitly authorized
the SEC to adopt rules requiring proxy access, although Dodd–Frank did not
require the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule.72 President Obama signed the
legislation on July 21, 2010.73 Just a month later, on August 25, 2010, the SEC
voted 3–2 to adopt a proxy access rule.74
II. THE FEDERAL PROXY ACCESS RULE
The SEC’s final rules contained the same two components as the 2009
proposal: new Rule 14a-11 (the proxy access rule) and an amendment to Rule
14a-8 permitting shareholder proposals relating to nomination procedures.75
Both rules were similar to the 2009 proposals, but Rule 14a-11 reflected two
significant changes. First, Rule 14a-11 limited proxy access to shareholders
that have owned at least 3% of the issuer’s stock, providing a uniform
minimum ownership requirement for all companies rather than varying the
threshold depending on company size.76 For the largest companies, this change
was a substantial increase from the 1% threshold originally proposed. Second,
the final rule increased the required holding period before a shareholder could
qualify to nominate a director candidate from one to three years.77 Nominating
shareholders were required to continue to hold the stock through the annual
69

See, e.g., DIV. OF CORP. FIN., supra note 22, at 6 (describing these objections).
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15
U.S.C.).
71 See Brady Dennis, Senate Passes Landmark Bill in Triumph for Obama, WASH. POST, July 16, 2010,
at A1.
72 Compare Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 971 (authorizing the SEC
to adopt proxy access rules), with id. § 951 (adopting an explicit requirement of periodic shareholder votes on
executive compensation).
73 Helene Cooper, Obama Signs a Contentious Overhaul of the U.S. Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 2010, at B3.
74 Adopting Release, supra note 12.
75 Id. The description in this Part summarizes the key features of the rule. The adopting release contained
numerous technical details not discussed here including the basis upon which ownership was calculated, the
procedures for contesting a shareholder nomination and the time periods applicable to such procedures, and the
manner in which a disqualified nominating group or nominee was to be replaced. See generally id. at 56,677–
740 (detailing the specific provisions of the adopted changes to Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8).
76 Id. at 56,674–75.
77 Id. at 56,675. The rule addressed various technical details concerning these ownership requirements.
Among these, ownership, for the purpose of using Rule 14a-11, was defined to include both voting and
investment power. Id.
70
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meeting and to disclose their intentions with respect to continued ownership
after the meeting.78 As with the 2009 proposal, shareholders were limited to
nominating a maximum of one director or candidates for 25% of the board,
whichever was greater.79
The final rule included new disclosure requirements for nominating
shareholders and their nominees. Under the rule, a nominating shareholder or
group had to file a Schedule 14N between 120 and 150 days prior to the first
anniversary of the mailing of the proxy statement for the issuer’s prior annual
meeting.80 Rule 14a-18 (adopted at the same time) extended the requirement of
filing a Schedule 14N to shareholder nominations made pursuant to state and
foreign law, as well.81 Schedule 14N provides notice to the issuer and the SEC
of the shareholder’s intent to nominate one or more director candidates and
requires, inter alia, information about the nominating shareholder’s securities
ownership; disclosures about the nominating shareholder and the nominees as
well as any relationships between the nominating shareholder, the nominees,
and the issuer; and disclosures about the nominees’ qualifications, including a
statement that the nominees meet the objective stock exchange independence
criteria.82
Presumably recognizing that few shareholders would be able to satisfy the
minimum ownership and holding period requirements individually, the
adopting release contemplated—indeed, embraced—the formation of
nominating groups.83 The federal securities laws have traditionally treated
collective shareholder action with suspicion. Indeed, the adopting release
specifically warned that communications among shareholders for the purpose
of forming a nominating group constitute proxy solicitations that are
themselves subject to Regulation 14A.84 Nonetheless, to facilitate the
formation of nominating groups, the SEC adopted new Rule 14a-2(b)(7). Rule
14a-2(b)(7) provided a limited exemption from certain of the proxy rules for

78

Id.
Id.
80 Id. This uniform notice period would have preempted an issuer’s advance notice bylaws. For a
discussion of advance notice bylaws, see JANA Master Fund Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 343–
44 (Del. Ch. 2008).
81 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,748–49.
82 See id. at 56,789–92.
83 See id. at 56,674 (“Shareholders will be able to aggregate their shares to meet the [ownership]
threshold.”).
84 Id. at 56,725.
79
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oral and limited written communications in connection with the formation of a
nominating group.85
The exemption applied only to shareholders seeking to form a nominating
group pursuant to Rule 14a-11; it did not apply to communications that would
have had the purpose or effect of changing control of the company, and it did
not protect shareholders seeking to exercise nominating rights pursuant to state
law or issuer-specific nominating procedures.86 The rule limited the content of
written solicitations to specified information, required that all written
solicitations be filed with the SEC, and required disclosure of oral
communications prior to the occurrence of the first such solicitation.87
Other aspects of the proxy rules impeded collective shareholder action.88 In
response to concerns about these impediments, the SEC amended Rule 13d1(b)(1) to provide that participation in a nominating group did not, by itself,
require a shareholder to file a Schedule 13D, rather than a Schedule 13G.89
This amendment was of particular significance for activist shareholders that
might have been concerned, after CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund
Management (UK) LLP, about the implications of engaging in collective
action.90 Group formation could, however, trigger the obligation to file a
Schedule 13G, and the rule did not provide an exemption.91 In addition, the
adopting release explicitly stated that nominating groups were not exempt from
the provisions of section 16 of the Exchange Act, effectively precluding the
formation of groups with aggregated holdings that exceed 10%.92

85

Id. at 56,726.
Id. at 56,726–27.
87 Id. at 56,726.
88 Fisch, supra note 5, at 1198.
89 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,736 (describing the amendment to 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d1(b)(1)(i) (2011)).
90 See 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir.
2011) (finding that communications and common objectives of two hedge funds resulted in the formation of a
group and triggered the disclosure requirements of section 13(d) of the Exchange Act). Qualification to file a
Schedule 13G, rather than a Schedule 13D, also offers shareholders the opportunity substantially to delay
disclosure of their intentions. See infra notes 224–27 and accompanying text (describing differences between
Schedule 13G and 13D disclosure obligations).
91 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,735 (“[I]t is possible that in aggregating shares to meet the
ownership requirement, a nominating shareholder or group will trigger the reporting requirements of
Regulation 13D–G . . . .”).
92 Id. at 56,737 (“[A]n exclusion from Section 16 is not appropriate for groups formed solely for the
purpose of nominating a director pursuant to Rule 14a-11, soliciting in connection with the election of that
nominee, or having that nominee elected as director.”).
86
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Finally, the adopting release made clear that Rule 14a-11 was not available
to shareholders that sought to affect the control of the issuer.93 Although the
SEC attempted to justify this restriction by stating that the rule was not
intended to serve as a substitute for the existing disclosures and other
regulation of control contests—despite the expanded disclosure requirements
of Schedule 14N—the resulting limitations were highly restrictive.94 Each
nominating shareholder or member of the nominating group was required to
certify on Schedule 14N that it was not “holding the company’s securities with
the purpose, or with the effect, of changing control of the company or to gain a
number of seats on the board of directors that exceeds the maximum number of
nominees that the company could be required to include under Rule 14a-11.”95
In addition, no member of a nominating group was permitted to join with
another shareholder or group in soliciting proxies, to conduct a separate proxy
solicitation, or to be a participant in another person’s solicitation.96
The amendment to Rule 14a-8 was similar to that in the 2009 proposal; it
reversed the SEC’s 2007 rule change and required issuers to include otherwise
valid shareholder proposals to amend the issuer’s governing documents
relating to director nominating procedures or disclosures.97 Proposals
conflicting with Rule 14a-11 or applicable state law were not permitted, nor
were proposals focused on specific directors or director candidates.98 As with
the 2009 proposal, shareholders wishing to submit such proposals merely
needed to satisfy the standard minimum ownership and holding requirements
of Rule 14a-8.99 As discussed further below, however, shareholders that use
93

See id. at 56,698.
Seemingly, however, the SEC did not view these limitations as sufficient. As it explained, the concern
about control contests also warranted extending the required holding period from one to three years. Id. at
56,697–98. “[A] longer holding period is another safeguard against shareholders that may attempt to
inappropriately use Rule 14a-11 as a means to quickly gain control of a company.” Id. at 56,698.
95 Id. at 56,675.
96 Id. at 56,682.
97 Id. at 56,730–32.
98 Id. at 56,730. The rule, as amended, permitted the exclusion of any proposal that
94

(i) [w]ould disqualify a nominee who is standing for election;
(ii) [w]ould remove a director from office before his or her term expired;
(iii) [q]uestions the competence, business judgment, or character of one or more nominees or
directors;
(iv) [s]eeks to include a specific individual in the company’s proxy materials for election to the
board of directors; or
(v) [o]therwise could affect the outcome of the upcoming election of directors.
Id. at 56,732.
99 Id. at 56,730.
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issuer-specific nominating procedures must comply with the complete filing
and disclosure requirements of Regulation 14A in a similar manner to
shareholders that mount a proxy contest.100
The new rules applied to all issuers that were subject to the federal proxy
rules, including investment companies as well as controlled companies in
which minority shareholders lack sufficient voting power to elect a shareholder
nominee.101 Many commentators objected to the one-size-fits-all approach and
urged the SEC to allow private ordering.102 Specifically, commentators argued
that issuers should have been able to design proxy access procedures that were
tailored to their individual circumstances.103
The SEC refused. The final rule explicitly precluded issuers from adopting
more restrictive approaches to proxy access through charter or bylaw
provisions.104 The SEC nonetheless purported to ground its approach in state
law by stating that shareholders could not use the rule if state law (but not a
specific issuer’s charter) prohibited shareholder nominations.105
At the time it adopted the rules, the SEC intended them to be effective in
time for the 2010–2011 proxy season.106 On September 29, 2010, however, the
Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce brought suit
challenging Rule 14a-11.107 The suit alleged that the rule was arbitrary and
capricious and that the SEC failed to comply with its statutory obligation to
assess its effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.108 The SEC
voluntarily stayed the effectiveness of Rule 14a-11 and the other amendments,

100

Id. at 56,733.
Id. at 56,682–83. The rule exempted companies that were subject to the proxy rules solely because
they had a class of debt securities registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act. Id. at 56,683.
102 Id. at 56,670–74 (referencing and rejecting commentators’ argument that proxy access rules should be
determined through private ordering).
103 Id. at 56,670–71. For an example of this argument, see Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chair,
Corporate Leadership Initiative, Bus. Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2–3 (Aug. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-267.pdf (“State law . . . provides shareholders
and boards of directors with the opportunity to deal effectively with the myriad of different circumstances
applicable to their companies in designing a proxy access and/or proxy reimbursement regime.”).
104 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,678–89.
105 Id. at 56,674.
106 See id. at 56,668 (setting the effective date of the regulations at November 15, 2010). The SEC delayed
the effective date of the new rules for “smaller reporting companies” as defined in the Code of Federal
Regulations. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Petition for Review, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1305).
108 Id.
101

FISCH GALLEYSFINAL

5/1/2012 7:46 AM

452

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:435

including the amendment to Rule 14a-8, pending the resolution of the
litigation.109
On July 22, 2011, the D.C. Circuit vacated Rule 14a-11.110 The D.C.
Circuit noted that the SEC “has a unique obligation to consider the effect of a
new rule upon ‘efficiency, competition, and capital formation.’”111 According
to the court, the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing “adequately
to assess the economic effects of” Rule 14a-11.112 In particular, the court stated
its belief that “the Commission has not sufficiently supported its conclusion
that increasing the potential for election of directors nominated by shareholders
will result in improved board and company performance and shareholder
value.”113
Following the announcement of the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the SEC
announced that it would not seek rehearing or appeal the decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court.114 By the terms of the stay, it expired once the D.C. Circuit
issued its mandate.115 On September 20, 2011, the SEC published a brief notice
indicating that the amendment to Rule 14a-8 and the additional amendments to
the federal proxy rules, other than Rule 14a-11, would become effective on
that day.116
III. JUSTIFYING FEDERAL PROXY ACCESS
A. The SEC’s Explanation
Despite the years of attention that the SEC has devoted to proxy access, it
offered a surprisingly limited defense of Rule 14a-11 in its proposing and
adopting releases. The SEC did not defend the rule in terms of possible
corporate governance objectives, such as increased shareholder voice, better
109 See Bus. Roundtable, Securities Act Release No. 9149, Exchange Act Release No. 63,031, Investment
Company Act Release No. 29,456, 2010 WL 3862548 (Oct. 4, 2010).
110 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1156.
111 Id. at 1148 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 80a-2(c) (2006)).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1151.
114 Press Release, SEC, Statement by SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro on Proxy Access Litigation (Sept.
6, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm.
115 Bus. Roundtable, Securities Act Release No. 9149, Exchange Act Release No. 63,031, Investment
Company Act Release No. 29,456, 2010 WL 3862548, at *2 (Oct. 4, 2010).
116 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9259, Exchange Act
Release No. 65,343, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,788, 76 Fed. Reg. 58,100, 58,100 (Sept. 20,
2011).
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board composition, or improved corporate performance.117 Instead, the SEC’s
releases offered two narrow and ambiguous justifications. First, the SEC stated
that the rule was necessary to ensure that shareholders enjoy the same rights
that they could exercise through personal attendance at an annual meeting.118
Second, the SEC suggested that proxy access might increase director
accountability to shareholders.119
As the SEC explained, the federal proxy rules were designed to replicate, as
nearly as possible, an in-person shareholder meeting.120 At an in-person
meeting, shareholders have the power to nominate as well as elect director
candidates.121 The SEC acknowledged that, despite this objective, it has
exercised its rule-making authority to restrict, rather than enhance, shareholder
voting power. One example of this restrictive approach is the SEC’s refusal to
adopt a universal ballot or form of proxy that would require issuers to disclose
all validly nominated director candidates.122 Another example is its approach to
Rule 14a-8, which has limited shareholders’ ability to establish nomination
procedures through private ordering.123 Recognizing that the federal proxy
rules have imposed affirmative impediments on “the exercise of shareholders’

117 Ironically, these were nonetheless the criteria against which the D.C. Circuit evaluated the rule. Bus.
Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150–51.
118 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,670.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Although state statutes do not explicitly articulate shareholder nominating power, the claim is that such
power is implicit in the statutory power to elect directors. See Carolyn Check & Michael Miller, Determining
Shareholder Access: Examining Shareholder–Management Relationships Through the Differing Lenses Used
by the SEC and the “Common Law” of Corporate Bylaws, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 297, 300 (2009). In truth,
existing director elections more closely resemble shareholder ratifications of the board’s choice of directors.
Alternatively, shareholders might be viewed as “confirming” the issuer’s slate, in much the same way that the
Senate confirms the President’s appointment of judges and other public officials. Issuers appear, however, to
assume that shareholders have the power to nominate director candidates. A recent empirical study found, for
example, that in a sample of large U.S. corporations, virtually all had bylaw provisions that explicitly
authorized shareholders to nominate director candidates. See id. at 303–04.
122 Rule 14a-4(d)(4), the bona fide nominee rule, explicitly precludes the use of a universal ballot by
requiring nominees to consent to their inclusion on a proxy card. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 5, at 1168–69
(describing the SEC’s refusal to adopt a universal ballot and its continued efforts to preclude shareholders
from having an opportunity to choose from among shareholder-nominated and issuer-nominated director
candidates); Richard J. Grossman & J. Russel Denton, Never Mind Equal Access: Just Let Shareholders “Split
Their Ticket,” M&A LAW., Jan. 2009, at 28 (describing the inability of shareholders to split their votes when
voting by proxy absent a universal ballot).
123 See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s response to private ordering
efforts by AFSCME).
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rights” to nominate and elect directors to company boards of directors, the SEC
explained that Rule 14a-11 was designed to remove these impediments.124
Critically, the SEC did not defend either its historically restrictive approach
to proxy access or its new regulations in terms of a normative perspective. In
other words, the SEC did not purport to be identifying an appropriate level of
shareholder nominating or voting power or to ground its regulations in
identified deficiencies in existing corporate governance mechanisms. Instead,
the SEC claimed simply to be implementing shareholder power under state
law. As the SEC repeated throughout the adopting release, its objective was to
“facilitate the effective exercise of shareholders’ traditional State law rights to
nominate and elect directors to company boards of directors.”125
Second, the SEC drew a relationship between the impediments to the
exercise of shareholder nominating rights and a lack of director accountability.
As the SEC explained in the proposing release, the 2008 financial crisis led
many commentators “to raise serious concerns about the accountability and
responsiveness of some companies and boards of directors to the interests of
shareholders, and has resulted in a loss of investor confidence.”126 The SEC
suggested that the federal proxy rules “may be impeding the ability of
shareholders to hold boards accountable,”127 observing that the academic
literature “points to a link between board accountability and company
performance.”128 Although it did not specifically find either that boards were
insufficiently responsive to shareholder needs or that Rule 14a-11 would
increase board responsiveness, the SEC nonetheless concluded that its rule
changes would “significantly enhance the confidence of shareholders who link
the recent financial crisis to a lack of responsiveness of some boards to
shareholder interests.”129
The SEC’s effort to defend Rule 14a-11 as facilitating the exercise of state
law rights was disingenuous. By specifying qualifications and criteria for the
exercise of nominating power, Rule 14a-11 attempted to create a federal
nominating power—a power far narrower than that granted to shareholders by
state law. State law gives all shareholders equal power to nominate directors
without regard to the quantity of stock they own or the period for which they
124
125
126
127
128
129

Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,025–26.
Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,677.
Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,025.
Id.
Id. at 29,026.
Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,670.
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have held it. With limited exceptions, state law grants all shareholders
governance rights proportionate to their economic interest without requiring a
minimum ownership threshold or holding period.130 State law does not
condition the exercise of voting power on shareholder-specific characteristics,
such as independence, lack of control, intent, and the like. Moreover, to the
extent that shareholder nominating power is based on the power to elect
directors, state law provides no basis for limiting such nominating power to a
lesser number of nominees than those upon whom the shareholders vote, much
less an arbitrary limit of 25% of the board.
At the same time, state law grants issuers substantial power to determine
the scope of shareholder nominating rights, power that the SEC eliminates
through the mandatory nature of the federal nominating power that it creates.
Although the SEC asserted that shareholder nominating power is implicit in the
shareholders’ right to elect the board,131 nothing in state corporation law
requires corporations to give shareholders this power. The SEC’s claim that
this power is “imposed by statute” and “cannot be bargained away”132 was
simply incorrect. State law allows corporations to limit or eliminate
shareholder nominating rights. Indeed, state corporate law does not even
require that the board of directors be elected by the shareholders—shareholder
election of directors is merely a default rule that may be modified in the
corporate charter.133 To the extent that Rule 14a-11 prohibited corporations
from adopting provisions that provide more limited nominating rights, it was
flatly inconsistent with existing state law. Similarly, the continued burdens
imposed by the proxy rules on nominations that do not conform to the
130 Exceptions to this general principle include tenure voting rights, which increase voting power for longterm shareholders, see Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1370, 1373 n.10 (Del. 1996) (discussing a tenure
voting plan in which shares held for three years would enjoy ten times the voting power of shares held for a
lesser period), and some state antitakeover statutes, which may have the effect of disenfranchising large
shareholders, see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 73–75, 85 (1987) (upholding a state
antitakeover statute that removed voting rights of acquired shares unless restored by a vote of minority
shareholders).
131 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,672–73.
132 Id. at 56,672.
133 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2001) (authorizing corporations to issue one or more classes
of stock that may have “such voting powers, full or limited, or no voting powers” as set forth in the certificate
of incorporation). Indeed, prior to the adoption of the federal securities laws, a number of corporations
restricted or eliminated the voting rights of common shareholders. See W.H. Stevens, Stockholders’ Voting
Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control, 40 Q.J. ECON. 353, 357–60 (1926) (describing the use of
nonvoting common stock by major public corporations in the 1920s). It is worth noting that many state statutes
require shareholder approval of specified transactions, such as mergers and charter amendments, and that those
provisions may afford voting rights to otherwise nonvoting stock. See id. at 359 (observing that corporate law
may have required a shareholder vote to ratify certain actions).
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requirements of Rule 14a-11 frustrate, rather than facilitate, the exercise of
state law rights.
This frustration is most apparent in the context of Delaware corporation
law.134 Delaware, the state of incorporation for most publicly traded
companies, recently amended its statute, explicitly authorizing corporations to
establish bylaws requiring the inclusion of shareholder nominees in the issuer’s
proxy statement.135 The Delaware amendments authorize shareholders to
establish shareholder nomination procedures on an issuer-specific basis and to
adopt (or reject) minimum ownership and holding period requirements
appropriate to the issuer and its shareholder base.136 Rule 14a-11, however,
prohibited bylaw provisions that were more restrictive than the federal rule and
subjected more lenient provisions to the same federal regulatory requirements
as mounting a proxy contest. In short, Rule 14a-11 eviscerated the enabling
approach of the Delaware statute.
That state law does not offer a foundation for federal proxy access is
illustrated most dramatically by the fact that Rule 14a-11 provided proxy
access for shareholders of investment companies.137 Most investment
companies are not even organized as corporations under state law, but as
business trusts.138 State law does not require business trusts to have
shareholder-elected directors.139 Rather, the requirement of a shareholderelected board stems from the Investment Company Act.140 In responding to
134 Rule 14a-11 similarly frustrates the exercise of shareholder nomination rights under North Dakota law.
North Dakota permits 5% shareholders to nominate director candidates without requiring a minimum holding
period or limiting the number of director nominees. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-08 (2007). In addition, the
North Dakota statute explicitly limits the disclosures that an issuer may require from a nominating shareholder.
Id.
135 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (Supp. 2011). Delaware’s legislation followed a debate over the validity
of such bylaws under Delaware law. Although many commentators took the position that such bylaws would
be valid, the SEC prevented courts from resolving this question for a number of years by allowing issuers to
exclude shareholder bylaw proposals. See Strine, supra note 5, at 1086–88 (describing the debate and the
SEC’s basis for exclusion).
136 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112.
137 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,683–85 (describing the application of Rule 14a-11 to
investment companies).
138 Philip H. Newman, Legal Considerations in Forming a Mutual Fund, in ALI–ABA COURSE OF
STUDY: INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 7, 9 (2008) (explaining that most mutual
funds today are organized as Massachusetts business trusts, Delaware statutory trusts, or Maryland
corporations).
139 See id.
140 Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to
-64 (Supp. IV 2010)); Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1961, 1967 (2010).

FISCH GALLEYSFINAL

2012]

DESTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY OF FEDERAL PROXY ACCESS

5/1/2012 7:46 AM

457

commentator suggestions that investment companies be excluded from Rule
14a-11, however, the SEC stated its belief “that facilitating the exercise of
traditional State law rights to nominate and elect directors is as much of a
concern for investment company shareholders as it is for shareholders of noninvestment companies.”141 The adopting release contained no source of
authority for the claim that the right to nominate and elect directors is a
“traditional State law right[]” for mutual fund shareholders.142
The SEC’s conception of shareholder nominating groups similarly lacked a
basis in state law. State law does not contemplate or require that shareholders
exercise their nominating or voting power collectively by forming shareholder
groups. Indeed, it is unclear how state law would respond to a shareholder
group’s exercise of corporate power—the selection of director candidates who
will be included in the company’s proxy statement—when that corporate
power is not available to shareholders generally. Would members of the
shareholder group, for example, owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders?
More generally, to what extent did a rule like Rule 14a-11 infringe on existing
board responsibilities such as determining the qualifications of the
corporation’s directors?143
Rule 14a-11 thus attempted to create a federal nominating power that was
both narrower and broader than shareholders’ traditional state law rights.
Specifically, Rule 14a-11 reflected the SEC’s ambiguous determination of
which shareholders are eligible to exercise nominating power and under what
conditions. In the next section, this Article examines that determination to gain
a better understanding of the objectives of federal proxy access. Although Rule
14a-11 has been invalidated, the rule was the culmination of repeated SEC
efforts to structure proxy access through arbitrary qualification requirements,
and as such, the following analysis should operate as a constraint on future
rule-making proposals.
B. The Terms of Federal Proxy Access
The SEC’s predictions about the effect of Rule 14a-11 were guarded. As
indicated above, it defended the rule in terms of “facilitating” shareholder

141

Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,684.
See id. Although the D.C. Circuit criticized the application of Rule 14a-11 to investment companies,
its criticism was limited to concerns about the SEC’s cost–benefit analysis. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d
1144, 1156–58 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
143 The relationship of state law to federal proxy access is considered in more detail in Part III.C.
142
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nominating power, rather than expressing an intention to increase the number
of shareholder nominees. Moreover, although the SEC predicted that the rule
“will result in a greater number of nominees appearing on a proxy card,”144 it
offered no judgment that the existing level of shareholder nominations was
insufficient and provided no benchmark by which to assess whether an
increase would be appropriate.145 Indeed, the SEC made all its substantive
arguments in support of proxy access without attempting to quantify the extent
to which shareholders would use it. It was only seventy-four pages into its
adopting release (as published in the Federal Register), in the context of its
statutorily required cost–benefit analysis under the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA), that the SEC provided any quantitative analysis.146
Both the analysis and resulting statistics were underwhelming. The SEC
estimated that, out of approximately 11,000 reporting companies other than
investment companies,147 forty-five companies per year would receive a
shareholder nomination under Rule 14a-11.148 The basis for this estimate was
“the number of contested elections [fifty-seven] and board-related shareholder
proposals [118] that have been submitted to companies.”149 Although neither
contested solicitations nor shareholder proposals bear any relationship to
director nominations under Rule 14a-11, the SEC stated that these numbers
indicate shareholders that “have shown an interest in using currently available
means under our rules to influence governance matters.”150 Significantly, of
course, shareholders did not need to meet any of the eligibility criteria of Rule
14a-11 to initiate an election contest or submit a shareholder proposal. The
SEC also did not explain the methodology by which these numbers translated
into an estimate of forty-five nominations.
Even if the statistics regarding election contests and shareholder proposals
offered a measure of the number of shareholders interested in corporate
governance, it is unlikely that any of those shareholders would have qualified
to use federal proxy access. Hedge funds, which were unlikely to be eligible,
144

Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,673.
See Jonathan R. Macey, Too Many Notes and Not Enough Votes: Lucian Bebchuk and Emperor
Joseph II Kvetch About Contested Director Elections and Mozart’s Seraglio, 93 VA. L. REV. 759, 768–71
(2007) (questioning the availability of a baseline by which to determine whether the existing level of contested
director elections is appropriate).
146 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,742.
147 Id. at 56,751.
148 Id. at 56,744. It further estimated that six investment companies would receive such a nomination. Id.
149 Id. at 56,743 & n.408.
150 Id. at 56,743.
145
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for reasons discussed below, to use Rule 14a-11,151 conducted virtually all of
the contested solicitations in the Georgeson list upon which the SEC relied.152
Shareholders submitted the “[b]oard related proposals”153 pursuant to Rule
14a-8, which requires a shareholder to own just $2000 worth of stock.154 In
neither case did the number of shareholders that chose to use these
mechanisms provide the SEC with a basis for estimating the number of
shareholders that would have been able and willing to use Rule 14a-11.155
To understand the SEC’s expectations better, it is useful to consider more
carefully the conditions upon which Rule 14a-11 allowed shareholders to
nominate director candidates. The minimum required ownership level was
perhaps the most controversial issue in the debate over the various
formulations of the SEC’s proposed proxy access rule. As the SEC observed in
its proposing release, commentators argued in favor of minimum ownership
levels ranging from the $2000 ownership level required under Rule 14a-8 to a
requirement that shareholders own 3, 5, 10, or even 15% of the issuer.156
At the heart of the debate is the question of which shareholders should be
able to nominate director candidates. The SEC accepted the position that
shareholders should be required to have a substantial financial interest in the
issuer to exercise nominating power.157 A minimum ownership requirement
could be defended as preventing nuisance nominations and unqualified
151

Any contest in which a dissident filed a proxy statement and distributed a separate proxy card was
included in Georgeson’s list. GEORGESON, 2009 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 47 n.* (2009),
available at http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2009.pdf. As a result, the list includes issuebased contests, such as proposals to remove a classified board, which involve a very different type of
shareholder engagement than proposing a competing slate of directors. The list also includes at least twelve
solicitations at investment companies, id. at 47, which raise very different issues than a contest at an operating
company. Moreover, by definition, a contested election involves a shareholder that is willing to incur the costs
of a separate solicitation.
152 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,743 n.804 (citing GEORGESON, supra note 151).
153 Id.
154 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2011).
155 The SEC considered and rejected, as alternative bases for its estimates, a variety of predictions made in
connection with its earlier proposals, specifically the 2009 proposed rule. See Adopting Release, supra note
12, at 56,743. These earlier estimates were largely based on counting the number of shareholders that met the
qualification criteria and then predicting what percent of eligible shareholders might choose to submit a
proposal. Specifically, the SEC estimated that 5% of those companies with at least one eligible shareholder
would receive a 14a-11 nomination. Id. The SEC first recognized that it could not rely on these numbers
because the 2009 rule had a much lower threshold for eligibility. Id. It then rejected the methodology behind
this approach, reasoning that the presence of a qualifying shareholder did not provide evidence about that
shareholder’s interest in nominating directors. Id.
156 Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,035.
157 Id.
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candidates. Although state law does not impose this requirement, the SEC
based federal proxy access on its own determination as to which shareholders
would make the best use of this power.
Neither the comment letters in support of a minimum ownership
requirement nor the SEC’s various proposals contained any empirical
justification for the claim that a minimum ownership requirement will result in
higher quality nominations. The releases did not show that investors with
larger shareholdings are more sophisticated, better able to identify qualified
directors, or more expert in corporate governance. Indeed, at least some
academic commentary has criticized institutional investors for supporting
governance reforms that are not correlated with improved corporate
performance.158 The releases did not demonstrate that investors with larger
shareholdings spend more money to research and monitor their investments;
many large investors have limited budgets and do not spend substantial
resources on governance research. The releases did not show that the interests
of investors with larger holdings are correlated with those of other
shareholders.159 Indeed, commentators have demonstrated that large
institutions may have competing objectives with respect to their portfolio
companies.160
Of course, a minimum ownership requirement drastically limits the number
of shareholders that can use a proxy access rule. First, as a practical matter, any
required ownership level beyond the most minimal precludes all retail
investors from nominating director candidates. This preclusion is arguably at
odds with the fact that, as a group, individual investors are most likely to
benefit from the cost savings associated with proxy access since their interests
are insufficiently large to make an independent solicitation cost-justified.
Because retail investors, as a group, tend to be long-term investors, the
exclusion is also at odds with the SEC’s articulated objective of placing
nominating power in the hands of long-term holders.161

158 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001) (reviewing empirical literature and
concluding that institutional activism has little or no effect on the performance of targeted firms).
159 See Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 877, 881 (2010) (observing that institutional intermediaries’ objectives with respect to their
portfolio companies may not be limited to maximizing firm value).
160 See, e.g., id.
161 See Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,035 (articulating this objective).
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The SEC did not explain why retail investors are presumptively
disqualified from identifying appropriate director candidates. Concededly,
corporate managers have long disparaged activism by individual shareholders.
Yet activists such as John and Lewis Gilbert, early champions of the
shareholder proposal rule, advocated a variety of corporate governance reforms
that have been embraced by today’s institutional investors, including proper
auditing, the elimination of staggered boards, and limits on executive
compensation.162 Harvard law professor and retail investor Lucian Bebchuk
has served as a type of modern corporate gadfly, challenging executive pay
policies and crafting innovative bylaw proposals to address the scope of a
board’s power to deploy a poison pill.163 Denver activist Gerald Armstrong’s
frequent shareholder proposals have included requests to eliminate classified
boards and to implement advisory shareholder votes on executive
compensation164—both issues that have been the frequent focus of large
institutional investors. Armstrong’s proposals at Supervalu, where he has held
350 shares for approximately a dozen years, received the support of a majority
of shareholders.165 Indeed, both Bebchuk and Armstrong are likely to be
among the investors counted in the SEC’s PRA analysis as those interested in
using existing corporate governance mechanisms, although neither qualified to
use Rule 14a-11. Retail investors may challenge management viewpoints, but
the SEC’s releases presented no evidence that, as a class, they are incapable of
participating meaningfully in the election process.
Even if a minimum ownership requirement is appropriate, neither the SEC
nor commentators offered any basis for selecting 3% as an appropriate
minimum. If the threshold was designed to limit nominations to those with a
substantial economic interest, one might have expected a threshold tied to the
overall size of the interest rather than to the proportion of shares that it
represented.166 If 3% is a proxy for a large dollar value, one would have
162

See Fisch, supra note 18, at 50 (recounting the Gilbert brothers’ shareholder initiatives).
See, e.g., Geoff Colvin, The Gadfly in the Ivory Tower, FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 2007, at 40, 40 (describing
Bebchuk as “America’s most influential critic of CEO pay”). Bebchuk owned 140 shares of Computer
Associates as of 2006. Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 738 (Del. Ch. 2006).
164 See Matt McKinney, Shareholders OK “Say on Pay,” STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), June 26,
2009, at D1.
165 Id.
166 Nor does the release consider relative significance—the size of a given investment relative to a
particular investor’s overall portfolio or total wealth. Consider, for example, the Florida State Board of
Administration, the $100 billion state pension fund that was the subject of extensive public criticism for its
loss of $334 million on its investment in Enron. See Alison Frankel, Class Warfare, AM. LAW., Mar. 2002, at
76 (describing the Florida State Board and the size of its loss); Mark Hollis, Enron Losses Trigger Scrutiny of
163
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expected the release to contain statistics quantifying the typical dollar value of
a 3% stake and explaining why investments of less than that amount are not
economically significant. Such an analysis might note, for example, that a 3%
stake in the toy company Mattel, currently number 392 on the Fortune 500
list,167 is worth more than $345 million168 and explain why an investment of
less than $345 million does not give its owner a sufficient incentive to make
responsible director nominations.
In fact, existing evidence suggests that shareholders view investments of
far less than 3% as economically significant and act accordingly. In 2001, the
Regents of the University of California had purchased more than two million
shares of Enron stock for the university’s retirement funds.169 The Board of
Regents was selected by the court to serve as lead plaintiff in the Enron
securities class action based on the size of the funds’ losses in the company
stock and a congressional determination, reflected in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995170 (PSLRA), that lead plaintiffs should be those
whose economic interest in the litigation is substantial.171 That the Regents had
sufficient incentives to litigate vigorously was reflected by the fact that the
Enron settlement included the rare requirement that outside directors contribute
toward the settlement out of their personal assets.172 The funds’ interest,
however, which at one time was worth close to $200 million,173 represented
less than 0.3% of the company.174 The Regents would not have come close to
qualifying to nominate an Enron director under Rule 14a-11.

State Panel, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 24, 2002, at 6B (noting mounting “criticism . . . over
the Florida pension fund’s losses in Enron stocks and bonds”). Clearly the loss, which represented one-third of
1% of the fund’s assets, was financially significant. Similar CalPERS’ and CalSTRS’ Enron stock represented
less than 0.1% of each fund’s total portfolio in June 2001. Kathleen Pender, CalPERS Had Enron Because
Many Did, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 9, 2001, at G1.
167 Fortune 500 2011: Top 500 American Companies—Mattel, CNNMONEY (May 23, 2011),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/snapshots/272.html.
168 As of March 30, 2012, Mattel had a market cap of $11.51 billion. MAT Industry: Toys & Games,
YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/in?s=MAT (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
169 In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 454 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
170 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
171 In re Enron Corp., 206 F.R.D. at 442, 459. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and
Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 61–
62 (2001) (describing the lead plaintiff provision of the PSLRA).
172 See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (describing the
terms of the Enron settlement and demonstrating the infrequency with which directors are required to
contribute personal assets).
173 Enron stock peaked at approximately $83/share. The Enron Scandal, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2002, at
3B.
174 At the time of its collapse, Enron had 754.3 million shares outstanding. Id.
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As the Enron example illustrates, the 3% ownership requirement would
have had the effect of limiting proxy access to a very small subset of
institutions. Public pension funds, union pension funds, foundations, and the
like virtually never hold as much as 3% of a company—holdings of even 1%
are comparatively rare because such concentrated holdings increase the risk of
a portfolio. Hedge funds often buy stakes of more than 3% but, as discussed
below, are unlikely to meet the three-year holding period requirement.175 The
only institutional investors that regularly hold 3% stakes for at least three years
are mutual funds, and even then, only a small few funds are likely to achieve
that ownership level for any given company.176 At the same time, mutual funds
have historically been among the least active investors in corporate
governance. Mutual funds do not serve as lead plaintiffs or submit shareholder
proposals.177 Indeed, until they were forced to do so, mutual funds neither
voted their shares178 nor filed claims to recover their damages in securities
fraud litigation.179
Indeed, the recognition that mutual funds and hedge funds were the most
likely investors to meet the ownership threshold may provide some explanation
for the second requirement to nominate directors under Rule 14a-11: a threeyear holding period. The SEC stated that this requirement would limit
nominating power to shareholders with a long-term perspective, based on the
premise that a short-term perspective is detrimental to an issuer’s long-term
performance and that, as a result, the interests of shareholders with a shortterm focus are in conflict with those of other shareholders.180 The empirical
175 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1420 tbl.8 (2007)
(finding a mean holding period of twenty-one months for hedge fund investments in a sample studied).
176 See Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism? Mutual Funds and Ownership Re-Concentration in
the United States, 5 EUR. MGMT. REV. 11, 16–17 (2008) (documenting increased block ownership by mutual
funds from 1999 to 2005).
177 See Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 880 (2005) (“Mutual funds have failed to
participate in securities fraud litigation at all, despite their substantial holdings.”); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E.
Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate
Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 319 (2008); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of
Shareholder Activism in the United States, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2007, at 55, 63 fig.3 (documenting
sponsors of corporate governance shareholder proposals).
178 See H. Anne Nicholson, Note, Securities Law: Proxies Pull Mutual Funds into the Sunlight:
Mandatory Disclosure of Proxy Voting Records, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 687, 696–97 (2004) (describing the
adoption of federal requirements for mutual funds to vote their stock).
179 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail
to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 879 (2002) (reporting that mutual funds
regularly failed to file claims in successful securities fraud class actions).
180 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,697.
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support for this conclusion is limited. Although corporate America has cited
the short-termism of institutional investors as a basis for restricting shareholder
power,181 there is little evidence that shareholders are able to convince
managers to sacrifice long-term firm value in favor of short-term interests.182
Indeed, short-term investors, because they trade actively, may be better
informed.183 A recent study by Yan and Zhang found that trading activity by
short-term institutional investors forecasts future returns and that the resulting
performance does not reverse over a longer time period—refuting the
argument that short-term institutions pressure managers to maximize shortterm earnings at the expense of long-term returns.184 The authors found no
evidence that long-term institutional investors had superior long-term
information or were superior monitors.185
The three-year holding period, however, would likely have eliminated any
remaining shareholders that could have used Rule 14a-11. Empirical studies of
hedge fund activism show that, contrary to many claims, activist hedge funds
are not particularly short-term in focus.186 Nonetheless, their median holding
period is about twenty months,187 far less than required by Rule 14a-11. The
average mutual fund turnover ratio has gradually increased to almost 100%,
meaning that the fund turns over its entire portfolio in a year.188 Of course, the
ratio is an average—some securities are held for just a few months, some for
much longer. Nonetheless, actively managed funds are likely to hold relatively
few securities for more than three years. In addition, those securities held for
longer are least apt to trigger board nominations because the longer holding
period likely reflects the portfolio manager’s satisfaction with the company’s

181 See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The
Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 203 (1991) (describing “[t]he short-term bias
imposed by institutional stockholders” and suggesting reforms to remedy the problem).
182 See George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism,
35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97 (2010) (explaining that no one has demonstrated that shareholders are myopic and that
myopic shareholder behavior would conflict with basic principles of market efficiency).
183 Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang, Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are Short-Term
Institutions Better Informed?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 893, 920–22 (2009).
184 See id.
185 Id. at 922.
186 E.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J.
FIN. 1729, 1731 (2008). Bratton finds a similar median holding period of twenty-one months. Bratton, supra
note 175, at 1420 tbl.8.
187 Id. at 1732.
188 See Katie Rushkewicz Reichart, Is Your Manager Trading Too Much?, MORNINGSTAR (Aug. 18, 2009,
6:00 AM), http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=304376 (explaining that a firm with a
turnover ratio of 100% has an average holding period of one year for its portfolio securities).
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performance. A portfolio manager can more readily address a perceived
problem by invoking the Wall Street Rule and selling the stock of a disfavored
issuer than by nominating candidates for the board.
Even indexed investors that do not actively trade were relatively unlikely to
meet the holding requirement of Rule 14a-11. First, because they are indexed,
such investors hold relatively small percentages of each portfolio company.
Second, fluctuations in the underlying indexes create a significant amount of
fluctuation in the resulting portfolios. As CalPERS explained to the SEC, just
two-thirds of the securities in its domestic index portfolio as of June 30, 2010,
had been in the portfolio three years earlier.189
The SEC acknowledged the restrictive nature of these requirements. In its
adopting release, the SEC admitted that two-thirds of publicly traded
companies did not have even a single shareholder that met the holding and
ownership requirements of Rule 14a-11.190 This statistic reflects the
significance of the modifications made to the Rule shortly before its
adoption.191 The SEC had previously reported that more than 99% of large
accelerated filers had at least one shareholder that could meet the ownership
and holding period requirements of the proposed rule, more than 85% of
accelerated filers had at least one such shareholder, and “roughly 59% of
[nonaccelerated] filers . . . ha[d] at least one shareholder” that could meet the
requirement.192 Even under the provisions of the 2003 proposed rule, which
would have required the occurrence of a triggering condition, a higher
percentage of issuers—42%—had a shareholder that would have qualified for
proxy access.193

189 See Letter from Anne Stausboll, Chief Exec. Officer, CalPERS, et al., to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman,
SEC (Aug. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Stausboll Letter], available at http://www.calpers-governance.org/docs-sof/
marketinitiatives/initiatives/proposed-proxy-disclosure-rules.pdf (reporting that 1570 of 2322 securities were
held three years earlier).
190 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,692. The SEC “estimate[d]” this data based on data
collected and reported in its proposing release that related to a one-year holding requirement rather than the
three-year requirement adopted in the final rule. Id. at 56,690 n.221. Given the significance, in assessing the
rule’s rationality, in determining the number of shareholders eligible to use it, it is unclear why the SEC
viewed an estimation process as sufficient.
191 Id. at 56,690 n.221.
192 Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,036; accord Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,693 (noting
that other studies reporting investor ownership levels typically did not include the requirement of a continuous
three-year holding period).
193 Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,794 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240,
249, 274).
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The SEC’s claim that Rule 14a-11 facilitated the exercise of shareholders’
state law rights was seriously flawed if the majority of issuers lacked even a
single qualifying shareholder.194 Moreover, qualifying alone was not enough—
for proxy access to have been meaningful, those shareholders that qualified
must have been willing to use it.195 Thus, the SEC’s release should have
included an analysis of the extent to which cost considerations, liability
concerns, and institutional structure might have precluded eligible shareholders
from seeking to nominate directors under Rule 14a-11,196 an issue to which this
Article will return.
The SEC’s attempted solution to these eligibility concerns was the
nominating group. Rule 14a-11 granted nominating power to a “nominating
shareholder or nominating shareholder group.”197 Specifically, Rule 14a-11
provided that the 3% holding requirement could be met by a shareholder group
that, “in the aggregate, . . . hold[s] at least 3% of the total voting power.”198
The SEC clearly expected that institutional investors would engage in
collective action to form groups with holdings of sufficient size to meet the 3%
threshold.
That the rule permitted aggregation did not mean that a qualifying group
would have been easy to assemble. The SEC’s own data indicated that, at 69%
of issuers, a qualifying group would require the participation of six or more
shareholders—six or more of the very largest institutional investors.199 By way
of concrete example, CalPERS explained to the SEC in its comments on the
proposed rule that aggregating the holdings of the twenty largest pension funds
on the share register of Goldman Sachs would result in a holding of only

194 Somewhat anomalously, for purposes of its cost–benefit analysis, the SEC projected that eleven issuers
would receive nominations made by a single shareholder. See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,744
n.805. Given that two-thirds of public companies lacked even a single shareholder that was eligible to use Rule
14a-11, it is unclear who would have submitted those nominations.
195 In addition, the SEC did not exclude corporate insiders, such as founders, CEOs, and existing
directors, from its statistics on qualifying shareholders, despite the fact that such insiders do not need Rule
14a-11 to influence board composition. For example, the shareholders who own more than 3% of Yahoo!
include founders David Filo and Jerry Yang. See Yahoo! Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 36 (Apr.
29, 2010). Similarly, Warren Buffet and Bill Gates (through the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) own more
than 3% of Berkshire Hathaway. Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 16–17 (Mar.
11, 2011). Warren Buffet is the company’s chairman and CEO, and Gates is a director. Id. at 7–8.
196 The D.C. Circuit did not view this omission as a deficiency in the SEC’s economic analysis. See Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–56 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
197 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,781.
198 Id. at 56,755 n.861.
199 Id. at 56,692.
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2.88%.200 Similar data previously released by CalPERS indicated that the ten
largest public pension funds together hold less than a 2.5% stake at Bank of
America, Microsoft, IBM, and Exxon Mobil.201 As will be described below,
federal law imposes various burdens on group formation, but even in the
absence of those burdens, overcoming the consent and coordination problems
necessary to assemble a group of this size is not trivial.
To complicate matters, the SEC was ambiguous with respect to permissible
group size and the appropriate methodology to be used in aggregating the
holdings of group members. The SEC did not explain whether each individual
group member had to satisfy the three-year holding requirement for the total
number of shares that it contributed to the group’s holdings or whether group
members could tack their holding periods. Tacking, which is permitted in other
regulatory contexts, such as the calculation of holding periods under Rule
144,202 would enable a shareholder that owns 3% for two years and then sells
to another shareholder that holds for an additional year to meet the holding
period by forming a group. Similar issues could arise with respect to members
of a mutual fund family—would the group satisfy the requirements by holding
a net position of at least 3% for three years, or would each fund’s contribution
to the total be limited to the number of shares that it held individually for the
entire three-year period?
Aggregation highlights a more fundamental ambiguity in the SEC’s stated
objectives. Rule 14a-11 did not limit the number of shareholders whose
holdings could be aggregated for the purpose of satisfying the rule. If group
size is unlimited, dozens or even hundreds of shareholders might join together
to meet the ownership threshold. Yet the SEC’s stated rationale for the
threshold was to limit nominating power to those shareholders that possess a
substantial interest. A large group comprised of smaller holders would likely
result in a delegation of power either to a shareholder that does not individually
meet the 3% threshold or to a third-party agent or intermediary. Either
delegation would be inconsistent with the concerns articulated in the adopting
release.

200

Stausboll Letter, supra note 189, at 2.
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Another View: Don’t Gut Proxy Access, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 21, 2010,
9:00 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/another-view-dont-gut-proxy-access/.
202 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(3) (2011) (combining the holding periods of acquirer and acquiree for
certain transactions, including securities acquired through pledge, gift, or conversion).
201
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The early experience with the selection of a lead plaintiff under the PSLRA
highlights the potential challenges posed by allowing aggregation of
shareholder interests.203 Plaintiffs, often with the assistance of counsel, created
lead plaintiff groups in an effort to assemble the largest collective interest in
the litigation and thereby secure the lead plaintiff appointment.204 In a few
notable cases, courts were asked to approve the appointment of lead plaintiff
groups consisting of hundreds or even thousands of shareholders that
individually lacked substantial financial stakes.205 The formation of these
groups created agency costs both because the groups were themselves
unwieldy mechanisms for making litigation decisions and because, in some
cases, the group was effectively controlled by a third party—in this case, lead
counsel—whose financial interests differed from those of the group
members.206
Ultimately, courts largely rejected extensive aggregation under the PSLRA
as inconsistent with the statutory objectives.207 Nonetheless, even smaller
groups pose coordination and collective-action problems. For example, the
lead plaintiff group in the Cendant case,208 which consisted of three
institutional investors, could not reach a consensus position with respect to
challenging the fee awarded by the trial court through an auction procedure.209
Even if these ambiguities were resolved, formation of nominating groups
would be hindered by existing federal regulatory burdens on collective
shareholder action. The adopting release explicitly recognized these

203 See generally Fisch, supra note 171, at 67 (describing formation of large lead plaintiff groups under
the PSLRA).
204 Id. at 54.
205 See, e.g., In re Network Assocs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(considering lead plaintiff applications from two competing groups, one consisting of more than 1725
investors and the other consisting of over one hundred institutions and thousands of individual investors).
206 See Fisch, supra note 171, at 71–73 (explaining how large lead plaintiff groups transfer authority to
counsel, creating agency costs).
207 See, e.g., In re Tarragon Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 07972 (PKC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91418, at
*4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2007) (citing In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 157–58 (S.D.N.Y.
1997)). The courts premised their analyses on the explicit statutory purpose of the lead plaintiff: reducing
litigation agency costs. See, e.g., In re Donnkenny Inc., 171 F.R.D. at 157–58 (explaining that the appointment
of a lead plaintiff group was inconsistent with the statutory goal of “prevent[ing] lawyer-driven litigation”). In
contrast to the PSLRA, the SEC’s release adopting Rule 14a-11 contains no such specification of the rule’s
objectives, making it impractical for the SEC or a court to find that a particular example of aggregation
frustrates those objectives.
208 In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2000), aff’d, 264 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001).
209 See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 717 n.363 (2002) (describing the disagreement among the Cendant group members).

FISCH GALLEYSFINAL

2012]

DESTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY OF FEDERAL PROXY ACCESS

5/1/2012 7:46 AM

469

burdens,210 but the rule changes did not offer adequate relief. In the absence of
such relief, the potential for formation of nominating groups is substantially
reduced. Regulation 14A, for example, requires shareholders that engage in
proxy solicitations to file those communications, as well as a proxy statement,
with the SEC.211 The adopting release explicitly stated that shareholder
communications in connection with the formation of a nominating group
would be treated as proxy solicitations.212
The SEC offered two limited concessions to the need for shareholder
collective action under Rule 14a-11. First, the SEC adopted a narrow
exemption, in Rule 14a-2(b)(7), for solicitations in connection with the
formation of a nominating group.213 To qualify for the exemption, written
communications were limited to four items: a statement of the shareholder’s
intent to form a nominating group, a description of the proposed nominees or
the characteristics of intended nominees, the percentage of voting power held
by the soliciting shareholder, and the means by which shareholders can contact
the soliciting party.214 Compliance with these limitations did not exempt the
communications from a filing requirement—written communications had to be
filed with the SEC as of the date they were first used,215 precluding
shareholders from testing the waters or exploring whether they wanted to
proceed with a 14a-11 nomination before publicly disclosing their intentions.
The exemption did not limit the content of oral solicitations, but soliciting
shareholders were required to file a Schedule 14N notice as of the time they
commenced oral solicitations.216
Importantly, the exemption applied only to shareholder nominations
conducted pursuant to Rule 14a-11. To the extent that shareholders attempted
to nominate a director candidate through other mechanisms, such as state
statutory rights or issuer-specific charter provisions, they would have been
ineligible for the exemptive provisions of Rules 14a-2(b)(7) and (8). Now that

210 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,681 (“We remain concerned that the Federal proxy rules
may not be facilitating the exercise of shareholders’ ability under State law to nominate and elect
directors . . . .”).
211 See Fisch, supra note 5, at 1140–41 (describing regulatory requirements for the solicitation of proxies).
212 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,725.
213 See id. at 56,780–81. In addition to the new exemption under Rule 14a-2(b)(7), shareholders could
continue to use the exemption under Rule 14a-2(b)(2) for solicitations made to no more than ten persons. Id. at
56,676.
214 Id. at 56,781.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 56,727.
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Rule 14a-11 has been invalidated, shareholders’ efforts to form a group for the
purpose of meeting a required minimum of nominating shareholders or
seconders under issuer-specific nominating procedures will be regulated as
proxy solicitations.217
Second, once shareholders formed a nominating group pursuant to Rule
14a-11 and filed a Schedule 14N, Rule 14a-2(b)(8) permitted them to solicit on
behalf of their nominees, and against the issuer’s nominees, without filing a
formal proxy statement.218 The rule only permitted such solicitations once the
shareholders received notice from the issuer that their nominees would be
included in the proxy statement.219 In addition, the rule required specific
disclosures and obligated soliciting shareholders to file all written solicitation
materials with the SEC.220
Commentators raised the concern that these filing requirements imposed an
unnecessary burden on shareholder efforts to organize a nominating group.221
The SEC responded that the exemption was sufficient because it provided
shareholders “with the opportunity to engage in activities for which they would
otherwise need to file a proxy statement or have another exemption
available.”222 The SEC did not explain how burdening efforts by shareholders
to communicate about the prospect of nominating a director candidate was
consistent with either the objectives of Rule 14a-11 or shareholders’ state law
nominating rights.
Other aspects of the federal securities laws increase the burden on
shareholder collective action. Regulation 13D, for example, requires extensive
disclosure from shareholder groups whose aggregate holdings exceed 5%.223
Rule 13d-1(b) reduces the regulatory burden for most institutional investors by

217

See id. at 56,729 (“Given the range of possible criteria that companies and/or shareholders could
establish for nominations, we continue to believe it would not be appropriate to extend the exemption to those
circumstances.”).
218 See id. at 56,781. The SEC previously adopted Rules 14a-2(b)(1) and (6) to exempt proxy solicitations
by disinterested shareholders from certain of the proxy rules, including the obligation to file a proxy statement.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1), (6) (2011). New Rule 14a-2(b)(8), which appears to be in effect despite the
invalidation of Rule 14a-11, extends this protection to members of a nominating group, so long as they comply
with the other requirements of Rule 14a-11. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,781. It is unclear how this
rule operates in the absence of a valid Rule 14a-11.
219 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,781.
220 Id.
221 See id. at 56,726–27 (describing objections raised by commentators).
222 Id. at 56,727.
223 See §§ 240.13d-1(a), 13d-101.
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permitting them to file the less burdensome Schedule 13G.224 Significantly,
while a Schedule 13D must be filed within ten days after a shareholder passes
the 5% threshold,225 a 13G need not be filed until forty-five days after the end
of the calendar year in which the shareholder has passed the threshold.226 A
13G filing is permitted, however, only for passive investors.227 SEC Rule 13d5(b)(1) explicitly extends the trigger for the disclosure requirements of section
13(d) to group formation for the purpose of voting.228
As part of the adopting release, the SEC amended the beneficial ownership
reporting rules to provide that participation in the 14a-11 nominating
procedure would not, by itself, cause an investor to forfeit its eligibility to file
a Schedule 13G.229 The SEC refused, however, to relieve shareholders from
the burden of filing a Schedule 13G if their aggregated holdings exceeded 5%
and explicitly acknowledged that, as a result of aggregation, some new
shareholders would be subject to the 13G filing requirement.230 In addition, the
adopting release warned that a Schedule 13G filing would only be available to
those shareholders that limited their activity to that permitted under Rule 14a11: “[A]ny activity other than those provided for under Rule 14a-11 [such as
approaching the board and proposing strategic alternatives] would make the
exception inapplicable.”231
The prospect of avoiding filing obligations or potential liability under
section 13(d) might, in itself, have created an incentive for shareholders to use
Rule 14a-11 to obtain proxy access, rather than to experiment with alternative
procedures.232 The invalidation of Rule 14a-11, however, appears to have
rendered this amendment meaningless. As a result, shareholders that engage in
224 See id. § 240.13d-1(b) (describing conditions under which an investor may file a Schedule 13G in lieu
of a Schedule 13D); id. § 240.13d-102 (setting forth information that must be included in a Schedule 13G
filing).
225 Id. § 240.13d-1(a).
226 Id. § 240.13d-1(b)(2).
227 See Id. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i) (providing that an investor may not have acquired the securities “with the
purpose nor with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer”).
228 Id. § 240.13d-5(b)(1). See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir.
2011) (describing how group formation triggers section 13(d) disclosure requirements).
229 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,676, 56,680 (describing the amendment to § 240.13d1(b)(1)(i)).
230 Id. at 56,751.
231 Id. at 56,736.
232 This regulatory advantage would potentially be far more important than any cost savings that proxy
access would provide to an activist investor. Cf. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy
Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1405 (2011) (arguing that activists such as hedge funds would not use proxy
access because the trivial value of the cost savings of proxy access would be outweighed by its disadvantages).
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collective action in connection with efforts to nominate director candidates or
adopt proxy access procedures risk being treated as a group for purposes of
section 13(d) and being subject to the resulting disclosure requirements.
Similarly, the SEC refused to create an exemption from the requirements of
Exchange Act section 16 for shareholder groups with aggregated holdings that
exceed 10%. The provisions of section 16, although triggered less frequently
than those of Regulation 13D, are more onerous in that they are not limited to
disclosure requirements. Members of a section 16 group are required to forfeit
short-swing trading profits under appropriate circumstances to the
corporation.233 Again, the SEC explicitly declined to exempt 14a-11 groups
from the scope of section 16, explaining merely that, “[b]ecause the ownership
threshold . . . for Rule 14a-11 eligibility is significantly less than 10%,
shareholders will be able to form groups with holdings sufficient to meet the
Rule 14a-11 threshold without reaching the 10% threshold in Section 16.”234
Critical to the operation of Rule 14a-11 was new Schedule 14N.235
Schedule 14N, which remains in effect despite the invalidation of Rule 14a-11
and now applies to all shareholder efforts to nominate director candidates,
requires extensive disclosure.236 The SEC has characterized the required
disclosure as “similar to that currently required in a contested election.”237 The
requirements are not limited to information about the nominees but include
information about the nominating shareholders, such as disclosure of any legal
proceeding in which any member of the nominating group has been involved
during the past ten years.238 If members of the nominating group are
corporations, the rule requires disclosure by officers, directors, and controlling
persons.239 Because the nominating shareholders are not themselves up for
election, this disclosure requirement seems somewhat intrusive, but the SEC
explained “that the disclosures will enable shareholders to gauge the

233

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (Supp. IV 2010).
Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,737.
235 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-101 (2011).
236 The disclosure requirements in prior proposals were even more extensive. See, e.g., Annette L.
Nazareth, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks Before the International Corporate Governance Network (Oct. 29, 2007),
available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102907aln.htm (stating that the proposed disclosure
requirements were “more extensive than those in a proxy contest” and “more extensive than that required of
someone seeking to take over the company”).
237 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/info/
smallbus/secg/14a-8-secg.htm (last updated Sept. 19, 2011).
238 § 240.14n-101(5)(d).
239 Id. § 240.14n-101(5)(c)–(d).
234
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nominating shareholder’s or group’s interest in the company, longevity of
ownership, and intent with regard to continued ownership in the company.”240
The disclosure requirements also present a liability risk for shareholders
considering the formation of a nominating group. Schedule 14N requires the
nominating group to make various representations regarding the net economic
interest of its members, the independence of the nominee, and the group’s
intention to hold its stock through the date of the annual meeting.241 In
addition, a Rule 14a-11 nominating group was required to certify that it did not
have the intention to change the control of the issuer or to seek more board
seats than permitted by the rule.242 The SEC explicitly noted in its adopting
release that the nominee, nominating shareholder, and each member of any
nominating group are potentially liable for any misrepresentations or omissions
in the Schedule 14N and “any other related communication.”243 Nothing in the
release limited liability to a group member’s representations about itself. This
created the possibility that the SEC or courts would impose on group members
the responsibility of verifying the veracity of each other’s shareholdings,
relationships, and intentions.
In short, the impediments to group formation were substantial, a factor that
had to be considered within the context of the large number of shareholders
required to create a qualifying group under Rule 14a-11, especially at the
larger public companies. The impediments are more substantial with the
invalidation of Rule 14a-11 and its limited exemptions, and make it impractical
for issuers to adopt nominating procedures that require the formation of
nominating groups.
Disclosure, the practical and regulatory requirements associated with group
formation, and the other elements of liability exposure make proxy access
costly. Many institutional investors are already struggling with limited
resources, making it difficult to allocate funding for proxy access. At public
pension funds and unions, such allocations may generate political outrage. As
Francis Byrd, a managing director at the Altman Group, a proxy solicitation
240

Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,715.
See § 240.14n-101 (setting forth disclosure requirements).
242 Id. § 240.14n-101(8)(a)(1).
243 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,676 (“Final Rule 14a-9(c) makes clear that the nominating
shareholder or group will be liable for any statement in the Schedule 14N or any other related communication
that is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or that omits to state any material fact necessary to
make the statements therein not false or misleading, regardless of whether that information is ultimately
included in the company’s proxy statement.”).
241
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firm, asks, “Can you imagine CalPERS or CalSTRS trying to justify spending
$500,000 on a proxy contest, while the state is struggling to keep libraries
open?”244 Similarly, many mutual funds, especially indexed funds, will have
difficulty justifying the costs in the face of market pressure to reduce fees and
provide competitive returns.245
C. The Exclusivity of Federal Proxy Access
The analysis in Part III.B suggests that few shareholders would have met
the eligibility requirements of Rule 14a-11. Of those shareholders that
qualified, many would not have been interested in shareholder activism. Those
that both qualified and were interested would have faced major burdens in
terms of compliance costs and liability exposure. One might infer from this
analysis a lack of SEC enthusiasm for increasing shareholder nominations.
Why did the SEC adopt a federal proxy access rule that did not provide proxy
access?
As indicated above, the SEC faced substantial challenges in adopting a
proxy access rule. These challenges may have led the SEC to draft its rule
narrowly, leaving the market to respond to any perceived deficiencies by
providing shareholders with more extensive proxy access rights than those
available under Rule 14a-11. Indeed, in the adopting release, the SEC stated
that any deficiencies in federal proxy access could be addressed through
private ordering.246 The SEC noted that shareholders can adopt issuer-specific
nominating procedures that expand the rights provided under Rule 14a-11,
such as reducing the requirements described in Part III.B above.247 Indeed, the
accompanying amendments to Rule 14a-8 explicitly permitted the use of
shareholder proposals to adopt issuer-specific nominating procedures.248

244 Preparing for the Dodd–Frank Act, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/weekly/20100723DoddFrank
(last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
245 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 140, at 1989 (describing Fidelity’s and Charles Schwab’s reductions of
fund fees in an effort to compete with Vanguard funds).
246 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,693 (“Of course, to the extent that shareholders believe the
3% threshold is too high our amendments to Rule 14a-8 will facilitate their ability to adopt a lower ownership
percentage.”).
247 See id. at 56,755 (noting that issuers’ governing documents may be modified to “enhance[]” the
benefits to shareholders by lowering the required ownership threshold or shortening the required holding
period).
248 See id. at 56,759 (“With the adoption of the amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8), shareholders will be able
to establish procedures that can further facilitate [their state law nominating power], if they wish.”).
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Historically, federal regulation of proxy solicitation has disfavored issuerspecific attempts at private ordering.249 As recounted above, the SEC rules
prohibit issuers from adopting a universal ballot combining shareholder and
management nominees. Although shareholders have always had the option of
nominating director candidates by conducting an independent proxy
solicitation, such a solicitation requires the shareholder to file a proxy
statement and all solicitation materials with the SEC.250 The SEC directly
opposed investor efforts to use the corporate bylaws to establish alternatives to
a full-scale election contest.251 Even with the amendments to Rule 14a-8,
shareholders that successfully propose and adopt issuer-specific nominating
procedures will have to comply with the proxy solicitation rules that apply to a
full election contest. In addition, shareholders that engage in collective action
are subject to the disclosure requirements of section 13(d)252 and, to the extent
their collective holdings exceed 10%, may also be subject to the short-swing
trading limitations of section 16(b).253
The SEC’s stated rationale for proxy access was to reduce existing
impediments to shareholder exercise of state law nominating rights. With
respect to shareholder nominations conducted through procedures other than
now-invalid Rule 14a-11, however, the new rules did nothing to remove these
impediments. Shareholders that nominate directors pursuant to state law,
issuer-specific charter or bylaw provisions, or foreign law are not relieved
from the filing requirements associated with a full-scale proxy solicitation. The
249 In its 2009 proposing release, the SEC observed that “the director nomination and shareholder
proposal processes are two areas in which our current proxy rules pose impediments to the exercise of
shareholders’ rights.” Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,026. Curiously, this statement is not included in
the adopting release.
250 Independent solicitations are also costly. The ministerial costs of printing and mailing a proxy
statement may be limited, see id. at 29,073 (estimating these costs at $18,000), although these costs depend on
the size of the shareholder base. One proxy solicitation firm estimates that printing and mailing costs range
from $4 to $6 per investor, resulting in a cost of $60,000 each time a shareholder conducts a mailing if the
company has just 15,000 investors. Julie Connelly, Proxy Access: Worth Little More Than a Hill of Beans,
CORP. BOARD MEMBER, Third Quarter 2010, at 50, 52. For General Electric, with five million shareholders,
these costs are obviously much higher. Investing with GE: Investor Information, Investor Types, GE, http://
www.ge.com/investors/investing/index.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
In addition to the ministerial costs, however, the costs of a contested election include, at a minimum,
legal fees, advertising, the costs of a proxy solicitation firm, and the costs of seeking the support of proxy
advisors. Connelly, supra, at 51–52. By way of example, Carl Icahn stated that he spent over $1 million in his
campaign to gain two board seats in 2009 at Biogen Idec. Id. at 51.
251 See AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the SEC’s opposition to the
inclusion of a shareholder-proposed bylaw amendment).
252 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006).
253 Id. § 78p(b).
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SEC’s rule changes did not permit such shareholders, even if they did not seek
control, to take advantage of the limited exemptions from the regulation of
proxy solicitations under Rules 14a-2(b)(7) and 14a-2(b)(8). Indeed,
shareholder efforts to experiment with nominating procedures by adopting
firm-specific charter or bylaw provisions offer a nominating shareholder little
advantage under current law over conducting an independent solicitation.
Absent a reduction in the regulatory burdens, shareholders have little reason to
adopt such procedures.
D. Rationalizing Proxy Access
The foregoing discussion highlights the destructive ambiguity in Rule 14a11. After so many years of debate, the SEC adopted a proxy access rule that
held limited promise in terms of increasing shareholder access to the proxy.
Even that limited promise was lost in the face of the SEC’s halfhearted defense
of the rule. At the same time, the SEC’s regulation of proxy solicitations
continues to forestall further attempts to increase shareholder nominating
power through state law and private ordering. What explains this regulatory
approach? Several explanations for the ambiguity in Rule 14a-11 are possible.
First, Rule 14a-11 may simply have reflected caution. Faced with extensive
controversy over the likely effects of proxy access, the SEC may have decided
to draw the narrowest possible rule in an effort to test the waters. There are
three problems with understanding Rule 14a-11 in these terms. First, as
described in Part III.B above, the qualification requirements under Rule 14a-11
were so stringent as to preclude virtually all shareholders from using it, making
it unlikely that the rule would have provided policymakers with a basis for
evaluating the efficacy of expanding shareholder nominating rights. Second,
the limited number of shareholders that would have qualified to use the rule
were not representative of other shareholders generally or activist shareholders
in particular. Third, those shareholders that would have qualified to use Rule
14a-11—those with the largest stakes—were precisely those shareholders that
stood to gain the least from the rule because they had the financial resources
and sophistication to nominate directors by running independent solicitations.
Finally, as was evident from the opposition to Rule 14a-11 and the
immediate court challenge, the SEC will face a substantial battle if it seeks to
broaden proxy access in the future. Rule 14a-11’s brief life was likely the
product of a rare opportunity—the confluence of the 2008 financial crisis and
the impetus it supplied for regulatory reform coupled with a rise in the political
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power of Democratic officials who were more receptive to shareholder
interests. The effectiveness of these forces in generating regulatory reform has
already decreased. Given the history of proxy access, SEC officials were
presumably aware that the political climate offered them a rare opportunity to
adopt a proxy access rule. They could not reasonably have anticipated an
opportunity to expand the rule later.
If Rule 14a-11 was not in fact an initial effort to ascertain the effects of
increasing shareholder nominating rights, how should it be understood?
Perhaps the SEC decided that this highly controversial battle was not the best
use of its limited political capital. As indicated above, business interests
expended tremendous resources opposing proxy access and predicting horrible
effects that would flow from its adoption. The SEC was presented with
empirical studies that, although seriously flawed, purported to demonstrate that
proxy access would damage firm performance.254 The adopting release failed
to confront these comments or to identify their flaws, suggesting the possibility
that, in the end, comments from business groups persuaded SEC officials that
proxy access was an undesirable governance change.255 Indeed, one might
have accused the SEC of sandbagging its economic analysis to provide the

254 Commentators presented the SEC with two empirical studies purporting to show that the SEC’s
proposed proxy access rules reduce shareholder wealth. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Measurement Issues in the
Proxy Access Debate 2 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 71, 2010). The studies by
Akyol and Larcker measured correlations between stock price movements and various significant news events
concerning the likelihood that the SEC will adopt a proxy access rule. See Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholders in
the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Director Nominations, 46 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1526081; David F.
Larcker et al., The Regulation of Corporate Governance (May 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://rockcenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/The-Regulation-of-Corporate-Governance_
Larcker.pdf. A combination of problematic coding decisions and confounding events raises serious doubts
about the studies’ empirical claims. In addition, a subsequent study employing a similar methodology reached
the opposite conclusion. See Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence
from the Business Roundtable Challenge 4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-052, 2011), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-052.pdf (finding that the market placed a positive value on proxy access).
Because the SEC does not discuss this research in its releases, it is impossible to determine the extent to which
the research influenced the Commissioner’s views.
255 It is worth noting that business interests conducted a substantial number of in-person meetings with
SEC officials in connection with the proxy access rule making. See Comments on Proposed Rule: Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 68. Similar meetings were conducted with members of the
institutional investor community. Id. Although the existence of these meetings is disclosed in the SEC
comment files, the substance of the meetings is not. See, e.g., Memorandum from Kayla J. Gillan, Deputy
Chief of Staff, SEC, to File No. S7-10-09 (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1009/s71009-648.pdf (reporting a meeting between SEC officials and the chair of the ABA’s Corporate Laws
Committee and stating that “[a]mong the topics discussed were the Commission’s proposed rules regarding
facilitating shareholder director nominations”).
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D.C. Circuit with an easy basis for invalidating the rule. After all, the D.C.
Circuit had previously warned the SEC of its obligation to consider the
economic consequences of its rules.256
Why then adopt a proxy access rule at all? The Obama Administration and
the SEC leadership had made a variety of public statements avowing their
support for proxy access.257 A failure to adopt any rule may have been viewed
as a sign of weakness or as catering to the opponents of proxy access.
Members of the press who had been following the battle over proxy access
with interest touted the adoption of the rule as a shareholder victory despite the
rule’s limitations.258 Some institutional investors publicly defended the rule,
stating that its limitations would ensure that shareholders selected director
candidates who enjoyed broad support.259 Notably, the last-minute changes to
the prerequisites for using Rule 14a-11, changes that dramatically limited the
scope of the rule, received limited public attention.260
Alternatively, the SEC may justifiably have been concerned about the
litigation challenge that any proxy access rule was likely to face. In recent
years, the SEC’s rule making, particularly rule making opposed by business
groups, has been repeatedly challenged through litigation. A number of these
challenges have been successful, resulting in the invalidation of SEC rules and,
256 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (invalidating SEC rules
regulating mutual fund governance and noting the SEC’s “statutory obligation to determine as best it can the
economic implications of the rule it has proposed”).
257 See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch, Activists, Take Note: SEC Delays a Proxy Vote, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2009,
at B3 (describing SEC Chair Mary Schapiro as having “championed the proxy-access proposal in response to
the financial crisis”); Kara Scannell, Corporate News: Policy Makers Work to Give Shareholders More
Boardroom Clout, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at B4 (reporting that three of five SEC Commissioners publicly
stated their support for proxy access). Although President Obama did not address proxy access directly, he
publicly supported increased shareholder voice, including sponsoring Say on Pay legislation, while in the
Senate. See Matthew Kirdahy, Say-on-Pay Edges Closer to Law, FORBES.COM (Nov. 11, 2008, 3:15 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2008/11/11/say-on-pay-lead-compensation-cx_mk_1110corpgovernance.html.
258 E.g., Jessica Holz & Dennis Berman, Investors Gain New Clout, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2010, at A1
(stating that the rule gives investors “greater sway” in the selection of directors).
259 See, e.g., Letter from Donna F. Anderson, Vice President & Global Governance Analyst, T. Rowe
Price Assocs., Inc., and Darrell N. Braman, Vice President & Managing Counsel, T. Rowe Price Assocs., Inc.,
to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09
/s71009-218.pdf (“[T]he rule should be structured to encourage collaboration among investors so as to increase
the likelihood that contested elections of non-controlling slates of directors take place primarily at companies
where there is broad consensus among shareholders that a change in the boardroom is warranted.”).
260 The Administration appeared to back away from proxy access at the eleventh hour, proposing a
measure that would have required a 5% ownership threshold—even higher than that adopted by the SEC. See
White House Intervenes to Weaken Corporate Governance Bill, COMPLIANCE INTELLIGENCE (June 18, 2010),
http://complianceintel.com/articleprint.aspx?articleid=2603470&single=true.
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more significantly, the dismantling of controversial SEC reform efforts.
Notable examples include Goldstein v. SEC, in which the D.C. Circuit
invalidated the SEC’s effort to require registration of hedge funds,261 and
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, in which the court overturned SEC rules
imposing increased independence requirements on mutual fund boards.262 The
decisions have reduced the SEC’s credibility and power in pursuing its
regulatory agenda.
SEC Chair Mary Schapiro clearly anticipated a legal challenge to whatever
proxy access rule the Commission adopted.263 The SEC may have believed,
however, albeit erroneously, that adopting a highly restrictive rule would
reduce the incentive for business interests to challenge the rule or reduce the
willingness of the D.C. Circuit to invalidate such a rule. It is plausible to
believe that business interests might have been deterred from challenging a
proxy access rule if its requirements were so stringent as to make its use
virtually impossible. This may also explain the lack of protection afforded to
private ordering; a regulatory approach that reduces the incentive for
institutional investors to push for greater access through state law or private
ordering favors business interests.
It is possible that the SEC saw proxy access, like the shareholder proposal
rule, not as a tool for increasing the effectiveness of shareholder voting but as a
communication device. The SEC has long defended the value of shareholder
proposals in communicating shareholder views to management;264 indeed, the
shareholder proposal rule existed and was used for four decades despite the
fact that shareholder proposals virtually never received majority approval.265
261

451 F.3d 873, 874, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
412 F.3d 133, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005); accord Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 936
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (invalidating SEC regulation of indexed annuities), amended by 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (vacating an SEC effort to exempt
broker-dealers from certain statutory requirements).
263 See Martha Graybow, Schapiro Braces for Fight over Proxy Access, REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2009, 1:56
PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53S6I520090429 (paraphrasing Schapiro as saying that
“litigation may result from whatever rule change is endorsed”).
264 See, e.g., Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40,018,
Investment Company Act Release No. 23,200, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,108 (May 28, 1998) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8) (explaining, as basis for overturning its prior controversial Cracker Barrel no-action
position, that “we have gained a better understanding of the depth of interest among shareholders in having an
opportunity to express their views to company management on employment-related proposals that raise
sufficiently significant social policy issues”).
265 See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45
ALA. L. REV. 879, 883 (1994) (“As of 1981, only two contested shareholder proposals of the thousands
submitted had ever won.”).
262
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The “proposals-as-communication” perspective is reflected in the SEC’s
encouragement of nonbinding or precatory proposals,266 proposals that have no
predicate in state law and that Vice Chancellor Strine has termed “imaginary
voting.”267 Although precatory proposals have no legal effect even if they
receive majority approval, they enable shareholders to communicate with each
other.268 Senator Dodd defended precatory proposals as providing shareholders
with “an essential democratic shareholder right to speak to each other.”269 This
view of shareholder voting as a communication device is also reflected in the
advisory votes on executive compensation mandated by Dodd–Frank.270
Like the submission of a precatory proposal, filing a Schedule 14N enables
shareholders to communicate their dissatisfaction with the issuer’s board
candidates even if the shareholders do not succeed in assembling a nominating
group or electing a shareholder nominee to the board. Indeed, the practical
obstacles to successful shareholder use of Rule 14a-11 were unimportant if the
rule was not designed to enable shareholders to nominate and elect director
candidates.
Further support for this communication reading of Rule 14a-11 can be
found in the SEC’s decision to extend its coverage to controlled companies. In
controlled companies, minority shareholders—those other than the controlling
shareholder—lack sufficient voting power to influence director elections.
Despite the seeming futility of a rule allowing minority shareholders at such
companies to nominate directors, the SEC refused to exempt controlled
companies from the rule.271 In so doing, the SEC conceded that the purpose of
allowing proxy access at these companies was not to further the election of
266

See Fisch, supra note 18, at 54–55 (describing the SEC’s “creat[ion]” of the precatory proposal in

1976).
267 Roundtable Discussions Regarding the Federal Proxy Rules and State Corporation Law, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (May 7, 2007), www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxy-transcript050707.pdf; accord
Strine, supra note 5, at 1088 (describing precatory proposals as “a pretend polity under Rule 14a-8 that had no
reference to principles of state law” (footnote omitted)).
268 See, e.g., Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, SEC, Shareholder Rights, the 2008 Proxy Season, and the Impact of
Shareholder Activism, Address Before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (July 22, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch072208psa.htm (describing and criticizing precatory proposals).
269 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, Dodd Stands Up for
Shareholder Rights (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=Newsroom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=796095f1-ade9-4777-9b56-587b06cf6430&Regio
n_id=&Issue_id=.
270 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat.
1376, 1899–1900 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (Supp. IV 2010)) (requiring the SEC to
adopt rules requiring advisory votes on Say on Pay).
271 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,685–86.
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shareholder-nominated directors: “[T]hough applying Rule 14a-11 to
controlled companies would be unlikely to result in the election of shareholdernominated directors . . . , we appreciate that shareholders at controlled
companies may have other reasons for nominating candidates for director.”272
A related theory is that Rule 14a-11 was designed to raise the level of
director discomfort without presenting a real threat of contested elections.
Public company directors are highly sensitive to visible criticism. Withhold
votes and negative Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations,
even in the context of an uncontested election in which the directors face no
realistic threat of replacement, cause them concern.273 As a result, proxy access
may be understood to offer institutions a bargaining chip with which they
could demand board responsiveness or at least board attention in exchange for
foregoing the steps associated with forming a nominating group.
Finally, the SEC may simply have lost perspective. After years of
considering proxy access—years in which opponents raised vigorous
challenges to every proposed rule-making effort—the SEC was derailed by the
effort to address each of these potential challenges.274 Each response led, in
turn, to additional line drawing. Commentators argued, for example, that
activist shareholders would use proxy access to circumvent the rules governing
control contests.275 Rather than evaluating whether the disclosure requirements
of Schedule 14N and the other restrictions of Rule 14a-11 provided adequate
protection in the context of a control contest,276 the SEC attempted to identify
272

Id.
See AMY L. GOODMAN ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES § 10.03
(5th ed. 2010) (describing issuer compliance with ISS policy guidelines to avoid withhold recommendations).
274 In part, this response may be a byproduct of the notice-and-comment rule-making process. Over the
years, as the SEC has attempted to structure its rule making to consider all possible arguments and objections
to proxy access, its proposals have become increasingly complex. As James McRitchie puts it:
273

I’m afraid too many will be distracted by the hundreds of questions raised by the SEC, the
labyrinth of language only an SEC attorney could love, and the need to arrive at a consensus
document that all with a vested interest in the status quo can at least live with.
James McRitchie, Proxy Access, CORPGOV.NET (Aug. 20, 2009), http://corpgov.net/2009/08/proxy-access/.
275 See, e.g., Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al. to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 3–4
(Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-212.pdf (identifying provisions
of Rule 14a-11 that, in combination, might allow shareholders to obtain a change in control).
276 Significantly, most contested solicitations for director elections include shareholder nominations for
only a minority of board seats. See SEC Grants No-Action Relief to Activist Shareholders Seeking to “Round
Out” Short Slates with Each Other’s Nominees, GIBSON DUNN (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/pages/SECGrantsNo-ActionReliefToActivistShareholdersSeekingtoRoundOutShortSlates.aspx
(explaining that running a “short slate” has become “the preferred approach for dissidents seeking board
representation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Among the reasons for this approach is that proxy
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the appropriate percentage of director candidates that would not pose a control
threat.277 Limiting the number of nominees forced the SEC, in turn, to
formulate procedures to choose among candidates proposed by multiple
nominating groups.278
The same can be said for the required ownership threshold and holding
period. Critics warned that proxy access would give union pension funds and
other special interest groups a tool to use against existing management.279 The
SEC responded by adopting a 3% ownership requirement—effectively
precluding unions and similar special interest groups from using the rule.
Critics expressed concern about the short-term objectives of hedge funds,
which frequently assemble holdings of greater than 3%.280 The SEC again
responded by imposing a three-year holding period designed to preclude hedge
funds as well. As former Commissioner Paul Atkins explained it, the SEC was
attempting “to find the magic number where ‘good’ shareholder groups (like
state pension funds) are in, but ‘bad’ groups (politically incorrect shareholders,
like hedge funds) are out.”281
The SEC’s efforts to avoid all possible bad effects or “unintended
consequences”282 may have led it to choose instead a rule that would have had
no consequences, intended or otherwise. Importantly, the SEC’s focus was
seemingly on avoiding bad consequences rather than identifying an affirmative
value to increasing shareholder nominating power and determining the changes
necessary to achieve that value. This evaluation, of course, would have brought
the SEC into the core of the corporate governance debate, an area the SEC has

advisors, such as ISS, are more likely to support activists who are not seeking to replace a majority of the
board. Id.
277 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,706–07 (explaining the rationale for the limitation of 25% in
terms of preventing the use of Rule 14a-11 for control contests).
278 Id. at 56,710–11.
279 See, e.g., Christine Hall, Dodd–Corker Fed Bill May Contain Left-Wing “Shareholder” Power Grab,
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Mar. 3, 2010), http://cei.org/news-releases/dodd-corker-fed-bill-may-containleft-wing-shareholder-power-grab (reporting that a coalition of seventeen groups expressed these concerns in
opposition to Dodd–Frank’s proposed proxy access provision).
280 See, e.g., Letter from Darla C. Stuckey, Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys & Governance Prof’ls, to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1 (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009610.pdf (“[M]any hedge funds seek to direct the operations of a company with a view to short-term
profitability or otherwise to the detriment of the long-term interest of companies and their shareholders.”).
281 Paul Atkins, The SEC’s Sop to Unions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2010, at A15.
282 Melissa Klein Aguilar, Proxy Access Debate Rages On, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Aug. 18, 2009), http://
www.complianceweek.com/article/5545/proxy-access-debate-rages-on.
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struggled to avoid since the 1990 Business Roundtable decision.283 Any debate
over proxy access that fails to evaluate its effect on the allocation of power
between shareholders and managers is, however, destructively ambiguous
because the best argument in favor of proxy access—increasing board
accountability—requires that proxy access increase shareholder power.
Similarly, the most potent arguments against proxy access are based on claims
that increasing shareholder power is ill-advised. In the following section, this
Article turns to the corporate governance debate and demonstrates how the role
of proxy access within the context of corporate governance highlights the
limitations of federal rule making.
IV. PROXY ACCESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The SEC’s failure to articulate a normative justification for proxy access
was the primary source of the ambiguity in Rule 14a-11. The SEC did not offer
empirical support for the proposition that U.S. corporate governance is
defective or explain how the proxy access provided by Rule 14a-11 would
improve it.284 Nor did the SEC provide a theory as to how shareholders might,
through proxy access, increase board accountability. The SEC did not
demonstrate that public company boards are insufficiently responsive to
shareholder interests; indeed, some scholars have argued that the 2008
financial crisis was exacerbated by an excessive focus on shareholder
interests.285 Nor did the SEC explain how the nomination and election of
directors representing a minority of the board is likely to impact board decision
making.286
These questions about the desirability of proxy access implicate
fundamental issues of corporate governance—determining the optimal
283

See Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783,
783–84 (1994) (explaining the SEC’s caution in regulating corporate governance because of ongoing questions
over its statutory authority to do so).
284 Commentators are divided on this point. Compare Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance
“Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1 (2009) (arguing
that the financial failure did not demonstrate the existence of a governance problem), with Grant Kirkpatrick,
Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 2009 OECD J.: FIN. MARKET TRENDS, no. 1, at 61
(identifying failures in board oversight as a substantial factor contributing to the financial crisis).
285 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 720–22 (2010) (explaining that focus on shareholder value maximization led financial
firms to take excessive risks).
286 At least one study has considered the impact on stock returns of a dissident obtaining minority board
representation. See CERNICH ET AL., supra note 4, at 25–37 (surveying 120 hybrid boards and evaluating their
effect on governance structures and shareholder value).
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equilibrium between management and shareholder power, evaluating the extent
to which the existing allocation of power has deviated from that optimal
balance, and assessing whether the regulatory reform under consideration is
likely to restore that balance. Critics and commentators strongly disagree about
these points.287 Reviewing and evaluating that debate is a difficult task that
extends beyond the scope of this Article. The challenges presented by this task
create substantial impediments to SEC efforts to regulate shareholder
nominating power through a federal proxy access rule. In this Part, this Article
identifies the problems inherent in mandatory federal regulation of corporate
governance.
A. Proxy Access and Corporate Governance
Shareholder nominating power—which, in turn, is an element of
shareholder voting power—is a component of corporate governance: the
mechanisms that allocate power between shareholders and management.288
This allocation of power addresses operational decision making and, in the
public corporation, attempts to minimize the agency costs that result from the
separation of ownership and control.289 Critically, to function well, corporate
governance must maintain a balance between managerial and shareholder
power.290 Excess managerial power increases managerial agency costs.291
Excess shareholder power creates inefficiency and may, in some cases, create
intrashareholder agency costs.292
287 Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833,
836 (2005) (arguing that the existing allocation of power is insufficient to enable shareholders to initiate valueincreasing changes), with Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561, 579–83 (2006) (arguing that large shareholders will use any increase in shareholder power to obtain
private gains at the expense of the firm and other shareholders), and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response,
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1758 (2006) (claiming that the
existing system of limited shareholder voting rights provides “substantial efficiency benefits”).
288 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 2 (2008)
(explaining that corporate governance is a “framework of institutions and processes” that, “[t]aken
together, . . determine how power within a company is exercised”); id. at 50 tbl.3.1 (listing major corporate
governance mechanisms for U.S. public companies).
289 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976) (describing agency costs that result from
separation of ownership and control).
290 See id.
291 See id.
292 See Nina Walton, On the Optimal Allocation of Power Between Shareholders and Managers (Univ. of
S. Cal. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 118, 2011), available at http://law.bepress.
com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1172&context=usclwps (modeling governance rules in an effort to evaluate
this trade-off).
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A variety of governance mechanisms contribute to the balance of power in
the public corporation. Internal governance mechanisms include the allocation
of decision-making authority established by the corporation’s statute, charter,
and bylaws as well as the ability of shareholders to impose accountability on
director decisions through their power to elect and remove board members.
Internal governance mechanisms also include the poison pill, which increases
management power in the takeover context,293 and the ability of shareholders
to call a special meeting, which enhances shareholder power.294 External
governance mechanisms include gatekeepers such as credit rating agencies,
regulators, and the disciplinary effect of the capital markets.295
Evaluating the effect of corporate governance mechanisms or changes to
those mechanisms is difficult. First, a specific governance mechanism does not
exist in isolation. Its effectiveness is based on its interaction with other aspects
of a firm’s governance structure. Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, for
example, found that the impact of a staggered board on management power to
resist a takeover attempt was greatly enhanced when the staggered board was
coupled with a poison pill.296 Similarly, Coates has noted that the effects of
staggered boards, which are typically viewed as a powerful management
entrenchment device, are avoidable in companies at which shareholders have
the right to expand the board or remove directors without cause.297 Alternative
governance mechanisms may also serve as substitutes.298

293 See Shira Ovide, Marty Lipton: Why I Invented the Poison Pill, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. BLOG (Dec. 29,
2010,
1:33
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/12/29/marty-lipton-why-i-invented-the-poison-pill/
(paraphrasing Marty Lipton as explaining that he invented the poison pill “to give boards of a target company
a chance to ‘level the playing field’”).
294 See Ted Allen, Showdown over Special Meetings, ISS (Jan. 20, 2010, 1:36 PM), http://blog.
issgovernance.com/gov/2010/01/showdown-over-special-meetingssubmitted-by-ted-allen-publications.html
(explaining the controversy over proposals that give shareholders the right to call special meetings).
295 See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 288, at 50 tbl.3.1.
296 Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence,
and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 904 (2002) (“Pills made staggered boards important.”).
297 See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L.
REV. 1301, 1352 tbl.3 (2001) (finding that these provisions made the staggered boards ineffective for 18% of
issuers in the study).
298 See Greg Hallman et al., Carrots and Sticks: The Threat of Dismissal and Incentive Compensation 3–5
(Oct. 21, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.areuea.org/conferences/pdf/52/723.pdf
(describing the substitution effect of two governance mechanisms in management compensation—the threat of
termination and pay for performance).
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Internal and external governance mechanisms further interact.299 For
example, scholars have devoted the greatest effort to attempting to assess the
impact of antitakeover mechanisms on corporate performance based on the
premise that, by reducing the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate
control, antitakeover mechanisms reduce board and management
accountability. Studies of any specific antitakeover mechanism are difficult to
evaluate, however, in that an issuer’s susceptibility to a takeover is a function
of a multiplicity of governance mechanisms that may include a poison pill and
a staggered board, a state antitakeover statute, and judicially adopted legal
standards for review of a board’s conduct in the takeover context.300
The second challenge in evaluating governance mechanisms is that their
effectiveness depends on firm-specific characteristics, including the firm’s
existing management team, its shareholder base, and its life-cycle stage. A firm
with a long-term, imperial CEO, for example, may require greater director
independence. A mature company may be run by managers who are unduly
inclined to engage in empire-building mergers or to retain excessive cash
flows. Firms owned by a high percentage of retail investors may face excessive
free riding and apathy, while those with many activist owners may be
influenced by short-termism or conflicting shareholder objectives. The very
governance mechanisms that are valuable for some firms impose excessive
costs upon others. In particular, increasing board accountability by enhancing
shareholder power is likely to be valuable for poorly managed firms and
wasteful, at best, for well run issuers.301
Finally, the governance needs of issuers are dynamic. In addition to the
firm-specific factors described above, which can change over the life cycle of
an issuer, a variety of market, economic, and even political developments can
disrupt the equilibrium between management and shareholder power.302 The
299 See Stuart L. Gillan et al., Explaining Corporate Governance: Boards, Bylaws, and Charter Provisions
(John L. Weinberg Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 2003-03, 2003), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=442740 (explaining that such mechanisms “interact to determine a firm’s governance
environment”).
300 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Picking a Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 471 (1995) (reviewing ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993)) (questioning event studies that analyze the
wealth effect of antitakeover mechanisms without controlling for other factors that affect the firm’s
vulnerability to execute a takeover).
301 See id. at 469 (explaining how provisions that increase management discretion may increase the value
of well-managed firms but decrease the value of poorly managed firms).
302 Similarly, such developments can change the effect of specific governance mechanisms. Robert Daines
conducted a highly publicized study concluding that Delaware incorporation was associated with increased
firm value. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 555 (2001).
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dramatic increase in the institutionalization of the U.S. securities markets, for
example, has increased the potential disciplinary effect of shareholder voting
power.303 The adoption by many firms of majority voting is likely to have a
similar effect.304 In contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court’s adoption of the
Unitrin standard305 enhanced management power by reducing the susceptibility
of issuers to the discipline of the takeover market.306
Several distinctive features render state corporate law robust to firmspecific differences and market and regulatory developments, as discussed in
more detail below. First, state law is largely enabling, rather than mandatory.
Second, state law is subject to regulatory competition.307 Third, the
development of state law is incremental. These features, which are absent in
federal securities regulation, enable state law to maintain an equilibrium in the
allocation of power between managers and shareholders.
Although state corporation statutes constrain some issuer choices, in most
cases, state statutes provide default rules that enable issuers to customize their
governance structures. With respect to shareholder power to elect directors, for
example, statutes offer a variety of choices, allowing shareholders to elect
directors through majority or plurality voting, permitting supermajority voting
requirements, and authorizing special voting structures, such as staggered

Daines identified Delaware’s takeover law as one possible explanation for this result. Id. When Guhan
Subramanian extended Daines’s analysis for a subsequent time period, he found that the “Delaware effect” had
disappeared. Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 33 (2004).
One possible explanation for the difference was a change in the importance of state takeover law between the
respective time periods. Id. at 52–53.
303 See Fisch, supra note 159, at 879–80 (citing statistics on the growth in institutional ownership of
publicly traded equity).
304 See J.W. Verret, Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? Majority Voting, Corporate Ballot
Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined, 62 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1009 (2007) (explaining how
majority voting “could serve to alter significantly the balance of power between shareholders and board
members”).
305 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373–74 (Del. 1995).
306 In Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that proportionality review under Unocal required an
assessment of whether the defensive measure was “preclusive” or “coercive” and, if not, whether it fell within
a “range of reasonableness.” Id. at 1387–89; see also Paul L. Regan, What’s Left of Unocal?, 26 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 947, 967–68 (2001) (explaining how the Unitrin decision disrupted the director–shareholder balance of
power).
307 Although issuers can elect to incorporate in any state, the majority of public corporations incorporate
in Delaware. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2000). I have argued that the flexibility and responsiveness of
Delaware corporate law are distinctive features that explain, in part, Delaware’s attractiveness as a state of
incorporation. See id. at 1064. Consequently, the following discussion focuses heavily on Delaware law.
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boards, cumulative voting, tenured voting, and nonvoting stock.308 Statutes
enable firms to allocate voting rights among multiple share classes and, in
some cases, permit corporations to grant nonshareholders the right to elect
directors.309 State law also permits issuers to adopt charter and bylaw
provisions that limit or condition shareholder nominating power, such as
qualification requirements for directors and advance notice bylaws.310
This enabling character allows firms to fine-tune their governance
structures to reflect differences in their shareholder bases, the extent to which
they have a high percentage of institutional investors, the need to protect
distinctive shareholder groups such as founding families, the extent to which
managers are substantial shareholders, and so forth. Fundamentally, the range
of available choices reflects the fact that the optimal structure and distribution
of voting power will not be identical for all firms and that customization will
increase the efficiency of the shareholder franchise. The enabling approach
also furthers experimentation. Issuers can introduce a variety of mechanisms
for increasing shareholder participation in the selection of directors, and their
workability and legality can be assessed on a case-by-case basis.311
The flexibility provided by enabling statutes is further enhanced by
regulatory competition. Corporate law allows corporations to choose the state
in which they are incorporated and, as a result, the law that will govern the
corporation’s internal affairs. Regulatory competition enables issuers to choose
from a menu of corporate structures and features and creates a natural
experiment in the effectiveness of specific governance provisions. Regulatory
competition provides two independent values. First, state differences allow
product differentiation. Nevada offers a legal regime that is particularly
management-friendly,312 for example, and North Dakota recently adopted a

308

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 408–10

(1983).
309 See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 703(a) (McKinney 2003) (authorizing the certificate of
incorporation to provide bondholders with the right to elect one or more directors).
310 See, e.g., JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch. 2008) (upholding
board power to adopt advance notice bylaws).
311 See Strine, supra note 5, at 1098 (explaining how the enabling approach enables “livable
practices . . . to emerge and awkward ones to be discarded,” judicial review to test the validity of new
practices, and “state statute writers” to address dissatisfaction with the judiciary’s treatment).
312 See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on
the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1856 (2002) (describing
Nevada’s distinctive provisions and observing that “Nevada has 15% of the non-Delaware out-of-state
incorporations market”).
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distinctively shareholder-friendly regime.313 Second, individual states provide
laboratories for experimentation with innovations that can be subjected to a
market test and, if successful, adopted more broadly. State antitakeover
statutes314 and statutes authorizing director exculpation provisions in corporate
charters315 are two examples in which such innovations spread and, over time,
were adopted by the majority of states.316
Third, the development of state law is incremental.317 State judicial
decisions employ a common law methodology that maintains consistency and
stability while providing the flexibility for courts to adapt legal rules to new
developments.318 The Delaware cases concerning the scope of director
fiduciary duties in the takeover context,319 for example, involved a series of
adjustments to the relative power of shareholders and boards, adjustments that
were able to reflect changes in the structure of hostile tender offers, the
development of financing structures, such as junk bonds, and the interaction of
state fiduciary principles with other regulatory developments, such as state
antitakeover statutes and the Williams Act.320
Legislative intervention, which frequently occurs as a response to issues
that have been developed through the factual context of specific disputes,

313

See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-01 to -33 (2007).
See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 735–36 (1998)
(describing the spread of state antitakeover statutes).
315 See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J.
1155, 1160 (1990) (describing how Delaware’s innovative provision authorizing director exculpation “diffused
rapidly among the states”).
316 See Carney, supra note 314, at 737–41 (citing other examples of provisions that spread among states).
317 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New
Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 683 (2005) (describing incremental evolution of
Delaware corporate law through Chancery Court decisions).
318 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 4 (1982) (“The incremental
nature of common law adjudication meant that no single judge could ultimately change the law, and a series of
judges could only do so over time and in response to changed events or to changed attitudes in the people.”).
319 A similar evolution can be seen in the Delaware decisions over the duty of good faith. Initially, a series
of decisions seemed to articulate good faith as a distinctive fiduciary duty, supplementing the preexisting
duties of care and loyalty. E.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (“The directors of
Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good faith.”). Perhaps in
response to subsequent lawsuits that suggested that the duty had the potential to create excessive litigation,
thereby chilling the board’s discretionary decision making, the courts cut back, retreating from the
characterization of good faith as a separate duty and limiting the scope of its reach. E.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary
duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.”).
320 See Regan, supra note 306, at 951–70 (recounting the evolution of Delaware case law concerning
director fiduciary duties in the takeover context).
314
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offers a corrective measure for reconsideration of judicially created rules.
Unlike federal regulation, which is typically an initial regulatory response,
corporate legislation is frequently a second step, taken after courts have
attempted to apply existing legal rules to a variety of fact patterns and the
legislature has been able to observe the consequences.321 As Ed Rock explains,
“[T]he Delaware legislature and courts cannot promulgate ex ante the
standards to govern new situations until they see a variety of cases and figure
out how well or badly people behaved.”322 Thus, after the Delaware Supreme
Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom323 appeared to subject outside
directors to excessive liability risk, the legislature authorized director
exculpation charter provisions.324 When the Supreme Court rejected a proxy
reimbursement bylaw as invalid under Delaware law,325 the legislature
amended the statute to authorize proxy reimbursement bylaws.326
B. Federalizing Proxy Access
Federal proxy access offers none of the advantages of state corporate
governance described in the preceding section. As a general matter, federal
regulation does not provide the opportunities for experimentation and variation
offered by state law. Federal regulation imposes mandatory and uniform rules
on issuers and limits the options for opting out of these rules.327 Mandatory
rules increase the stakes involved for regulators such as the SEC in
ascertaining the optimal regulatory structure. They also reduce the potential for
competition and the market to discipline politically motivated choices that may
be inefficient.328 In contrast, rules that allow issuer-specific choice produce
valuable evidence on the efficiency of regulatory choices, both directly by
producing the variation needed to assess the effects of the rules and indirectly
by prompting issuers to opt out of inefficient regulation.329
321

See Strine, supra note 5, at 1098 (“[I]f either the stockholders or managers are dissatisfied by the
judiciary’s treatment of those proposals, pressure will be put on state statute writers to address their
concerns.”).
322 Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1009, 1102 (1997).
323 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
324 Romano, supra note 315, at 1160.
325 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 239–40 (Del. 2008).
326 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (Supp. 2011).
327 See ROMANO, supra note 300, at 86–96 (summarizing arguments in the debate over mandatory versus
enabling corporate law).
328 See id. at 82–83.
329 An example is the takeover context. Empirical studies reported a substantial negative price effect on
issuers that were subject to the restrictive Pennsylvania antitakeover statute. See, e.g., P.R. Chandy et al., The
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That is not to say that mandatory rules are always inappropriate. As the
preceding section has explained, however, uniform national rules are likely to
be suboptimal tools for regulating corporate governance. In particular,
shareholder nominating power is embedded in the state regulatory framework
of shareholder voting. State law is the source of shareholder voting power.
State law provides the tools by which issuers can customize shareholder voting
power through charter and bylaw provisions. State law supplies the fiduciary
principles that limit management power to interfere with shareholder voting
rights.330 Shareholder nominating rights interact with both the scope of their
substantive voting rights and the structural mechanisms that govern the voting
process.
Both this interaction and the difficulty of evaluating the effect of corporate
governance regulation create challenges for the regulation of shareholder
nominating power. Federal regulation is poorly suited for the kind of
experimentation that is particularly valuable in an area in which it is difficult,
ex ante, to identify the optimal regulatory approach.331 The process is
complicated by the heavily politicized nature of the SEC rule-making process.
The massive letter-writing campaigns and lobbying efforts associated with the
SEC’s consideration of proxy access contributed to regulatory gridlock and
vastly complicated the task of structuring the regulation. The nature of proxy
access, which involves a shift of power from concentrated and well-funded
corporate managers to dispersed investors with comparatively small stakes,
increased the potential that the rule-making record would be distorted.332
Under private ordering, issuers could vary their nominating procedures, and
Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Pennsylvania Fourth Generation Anti-Takeover Law, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 399,
403 (1995). Because the statute provided an opt-out provision, however, issuers could and did avoid the price
effect by exercising their ability to opt out. See id.
330 See, e.g., Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (articulating the heightened
standard of “compelling justification” for review for board decisions that interfere with the shareholder
franchise).
331 As Vice Chancellor Strine explains, private ordering through issuer-specific bylaws enables “the
market [to] assess what works best without the high costs that come with the imposition of an unproven,
invariable mandate.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long
Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 7 (2010).
332 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 62–63 (1994) (explaining how concentrated groups
with large stakes can present distorted pictures of the public interest to political officials); cf. Letter from
Joseph A. Grundfest, Co-Dir., Rock Ctr. on Corporate Governance, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Jan.
18, 2010), available at www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-599.pdf (attaching a working paper for the
purpose of “drawing the Commission’s attention” to two highly flawed empirical studies that demonstrated,
according to the commentator, that “proxy access . . . is inimical to the best interests of the shareholder
community as a whole”).
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one issuer’s approach could differ from that of its competitor. This variation
eliminates the pressure to ensure that a single mandated rule is optimal.
Nor can federal regulation be defended, in the context of proxy access, as a
necessary response to the inability of shareholders to obtain minimally
acceptable levels of proxy access through state law and private ordering.333
First, as indicated above, the level of proxy access that Rule 14a-11 provided
to investors was truly minimal. To the extent that few, if any, shareholders
would have qualified to use Rule 14a-11 and that those few qualifying
shareholders already had sufficient access to the proxy by mounting an election
contest, Rule 14a-11 did not remedy any existing obstacles.334 Second, federal
regulation, not state law, has historically been the dominant obstacle to private
ordering. The SEC rules, not state law, prevent the use of a universal ballot that
would afford shareholders the freedom to choose from a complete list of issuer
and shareholder candidates.335 The SEC rules, not state law, burden
shareholder attempts to engage in collective action in connection with the
election process by regulating such attempts as proxy solicitations. And the
SEC rules impose compliance costs, including filing requirements, on
shareholders seeking to exercise their state law nominating power.
Third, and most importantly, while state law cannot provide shareholders
with the ability to overcome existing federal regulatory obstacles, it can
nonetheless undercut the minimum level of nominating power afforded by a

333 Some commentators argued that a mandatory federal proxy access rule was necessary because of the
limitations on shareholder ability to establish proxy access procedures through private ordering. See, e.g.,
Letter from Julie Gresham, Corporate Sec’y, Shareowner Educ. Network, and Ann Yerger, Exec. Dir., Council
of Inst. Investors, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-10-09/s71009-568.pdf.
334 The extent of those obstacles may also be overstated. For example, the SEC identified various
limitations on shareholder power to amend the bylaws to establish proxy access procedures. Adopting Release,
supra note 12, at 56,673. However, only about 4% of Russell 3000 companies do not permit shareholders to
amend the bylaws. Beth Young, The Limits of Private Ordering: Restrictions on Shareholders’ Ability to
Initiate Governance Change and Distortions of the Shareholder Voting Process, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS 6 (2009), http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/The%20Limits%20of%20Private%20Ordering%20
UPDATED%2011-17-09.pdf. In addition, market developments suggest that institutional investors are making
substantial progress in increasing shareholder voting power, despite the SEC’s resistance to their efforts. See
Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 872–76 (2010).
335 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d)(4) (2011) (prohibiting the inclusion of director candidates on proxy cards
without their consent); accord Zachery Kouwe, Ackman and Target Tangle in Ballot Brawl, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Apr. 21, 2009, 7:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/04/21/ackman-and-target-tangle-inballot-brawl/ (“Currently, shareholders in most contested corporate elections, including Target’s, receive two
proxy cards and can vote only for one slate of candidates.”).
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federal rule. Thus, to the extent that Rule 14a-11 was an effort to respond to
limitations in state law or private ordering, it was inadequate.
Rule 14a-11 explicitly provided that it was subject to the availability of
shareholder nominating rights under state law.336 Accordingly, state
legislatures could have completely nullified the effect of the rule by
eliminating shareholder nominating power—such as by vesting such power in
the board or a board nominating committee. Similarly, after the rule’s
adoption, commentators immediately suggested that issuers consider
implementing director qualification bylaws.337 Although Rule 14a-11 did not
permit an issuer to exclude a shareholder nominee from the ballot on the basis
that the nominee did not meet the company’s qualification requirements,338
nothing in the SEC rules required a company to seat a director that did not
meet its qualification requirements.339 Similarly, issuers could have thwarted
shareholder efforts at group formation by adopting low-threshold poison
pills.340 One academic outlined fifteen possible ways of limiting shareholder
nominating power,341 and it seems difficult to imagine the SEC precluding
these responses without taking on a much more substantive role in regulating
corporate governance—a role extending well beyond the authorization in
Dodd–Frank.
Finally, state regulation of corporate governance offers extensive
safeguards against excessive or inefficient shareholder activism. Individual
issuers can limit proxy access, in the same manner that Rule 14a-11 did, by

336 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,674 (“The rule defers entirely to State law as to whether
shareholders have the right to nominate directors and what voting rights shareholders have in the election of
directors.”).
337 See, e.g., Adam O. Emmerich, Shareholder Proxy Access: Time to Get Ready, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 16, 2010, 9:21 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/09/
16/shareholder-proxy-access-time-to-get-ready/ (suggesting that companies review their director qualification
bylaws and stating that “companies may, subject to state law, preclude nominees from serving as directors for
failure to satisfy reasonable qualification requirements”).
338 See id.
339 Indeed, there is case authority suggesting that the election of a director who did not, at the time of his
election, meet the company’s qualification requirements would be invalid. See Keith Paul Bishop, Director
Qualification Requirements, Nominations & Proxy Access, CAL. CORP. & SEC. L. (Sept. 7, 2010), http://
calcorporatelaw.com/2010/09/director-qualification-requirements-nominations-proxy-access/
(citing
and
discussing Waterbury v. Temescal Water Co., 105 P. 940 (Cal. Ct. App. 1909)).
340 See, e.g., Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010) (upholding the validity of a pill
with a 4.99% trigger).
341 J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware’s Future Reviewing Company
Defenses in the Era of Dodd–Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391, 404–15 (2011).
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imposing minimum ownership and holding period requirements.342 To the
extent that such bylaws unduly restrict shareholder nominating power, state
courts and legislatures have a variety of responses available, ranging from the
use of judicially imposed limits on the extent to which these bylaws can limit
shareholder voting rights343 to legislative requirements that such limitations be
included in the corporate charter (and thus approved by shareholders) rather
than being implemented through a director-adopted bylaw.344
V. AN ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY APPROACH
This Article has questioned the SEC’s motives in adopting a federal proxy
access rule and challenged the SEC’s competence to establish appropriate
criteria for modifying the balance of power between shareholders and
management in determining the composition of the board of directors.
Although existing political forces are likely to preclude the SEC from
responding to the D.C. Circuit decision in the short term, the invalidation of
Rule 14a-11 should cause the SEC to reconsider its overall approach to
shareholder participation in the nomination of directors.
The solution to the deficiencies described in this Article, along with the
concerns identified by the D.C. Circuit, is not to return to the pre-Rule 14a-11
status quo. As the SEC itself recognized, both the promulgation and
interpretation of the federal proxy rules directly interfere with the exercise of
shareholder power and shareholder attempts to reallocate the balance of
authority at individual issuers with respect to both the composition of the board
of directors and other governance issues. Rather than attempting to determine
an appropriate balance of power, the SEC should simply stop trying to regulate
corporate governance. Instead, the SEC should revise the federal proxy rules to
remove the impediments that currently limit the ability of states, issuers, and
shareholders to experiment with, vary, and improve governance structures.

342 Cf. JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 340–46 (Del. Ch. 2008)
(upholding the validity of an advance notice bylaw but reading it narrowly); ROBERT R. CARLSON & JEFFREY
T. HARTLIN, PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER LLP, REVISITING ADVANCE NOTICE BYLAWS IN LIGHT
OF RECENT DELAWARE DECISIONS 1 (2008), available at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/981.
pdf (advising clients on how to revise advance notice bylaws to reflect concerns raised by recent Delaware
decisions).
343 See JANA Master Fund, Ltd., 954 A.2d at 338 (determining whether CNET’s advance notice bylaw, if
construed broadly, should be held invalid as “an unreasonable restriction on [the] shareholder franchise”).
344 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (Supp. 2008) (permitting issuers to establish classified boards
through charter provision but not through director-adopted bylaw).

FISCH GALLEYSFINAL

2012]

DESTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY OF FEDERAL PROXY ACCESS

5/1/2012 7:46 AM

495

Removing these impediments is easy. Instead of trying to structure proxy
access, the SEC should allow state law to determine both the circumstances
under which shareholders have the power to nominate director candidates and
the appropriate qualifications for nominating shareholders and their nominees.
State law can make these determinations in a variety of ways. State statutes can
set forth the scope of shareholder nominating power. Similarly, state statutes
can, as Delaware already does, explicitly authorize issuers to adopt
individually tailored nominating procedures and to describe the manner for
doing so. Under the traditional enabling approach of state law, issuers can
establish individually tailored nominating procedures directly, through charter
and bylaw provisions, and indirectly, by specifying director qualification
requirements, advance notice rules, annual meeting procedures, and so forth.
Overreaching by either shareholders or corporate management can be
constrained through judicial review—state courts can evaluate the permissible
scope of issuer-specific provisions and restrictions consistent with
shareholders’ statutory voting authority and management’s fiduciary
obligations. Federal proxy rules should, instead, focus on the SEC’s core
competency—disclosure.
Accordingly, this Article advocates the following regulatory changes. First,
the SEC should amend Regulation 14A to require issuers to disclose in their
proxy statements all properly nominated director candidates, whether the
nominations are made by a nominating committee, a shareholder, or some
other mechanism.345 State law, including case law, state corporation statutes,
and the issuer’s governing documents (to the extent those documents are
consistent with state law), would determine whether a nomination is proper.
This amendment would enable individual issuers to experiment with varying
criteria, such as the ownership threshold or holding period, to determine the
extent to which their choices affected the quality and quantity of shareholder
nominations. It would also allow issuers to experiment with other mechanisms
for increasing shareholder input, such as expense reimbursement or
shareholder representation on nominating committees. Issuers would also have
the power to adopt mechanisms to limit the extent of shareholder input,

345

In 2002, Les Greenberg and James McRitchie filed a rule-making petition with the SEC proposing an
amendment to Rule 14a-8 that, although structured somewhat differently from the proposal in this Article,
would have had the similar effect of providing “that the solicitation of proxies for all nominees for Director
positions, who meet the other legal requirements, be required to be included in the Company’s proxy
materials.” Request for Rulemaking to Amend Rule 14a-8(i) to Allow Shareholder Proposals to Elect
Directors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 1, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-461.htm.
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including imposing qualification requirements and establishing methods for
determining priority among director candidates.
In terms of disclosure, federal law would require that the issuer provide
comparable disclosure in the proxy statement for all director candidates,
including the directors’ employment, compensation, other directorships, and
qualifications. Nominating shareholders and their nominees would be required
to supply this information to the issuer as a condition of inclusion in the proxy
statement. Issuers would also be required to disclose, in the proxy statement
and for each director candidate, the source of that director’s nomination (e.g.,
issuer nominating committee or shareholder). If the issuer’s proxy statement
includes a statement in support of any of the board-nominated director
candidates, Regulation 14A would require the board to give nominating
shareholders the opportunity to include a supporting statement of equal length
for their nominees.
Second, consistent with the disclosure in the proxy statement, the SEC
should amend Rule 14a-4 to require the issuer’s proxy card to give
shareholders the opportunity to vote for any of the candidates included in the
proxy statement. The proxy card would thus constitute a universal ballot for all
properly nominated candidates.
Third, the SEC should adopt exemptions from sections 13(d) and 16(b) for
collective shareholder action in connection with the election of directors so
long as the shareholders do not, individually or collectively, seek to obtain
economic control of the issuer. Specifically, the exemption should provide that
collective shareholder action does not, itself, create a group for purposes of
13(d) or result in the aggregation of shareholder holdings for purposes of 13(d)
or 16(b). Such exemptions should extend to both the nomination and the
election of directors and the collective action associated with proposed bylaw
amendments concerning director qualifications, nominating procedures, and
similar issues.
Finally, the federal proxy rules should directly facilitate issuer efforts to
experiment with different mechanisms for private ordering. In particular, the
SEC should extend the disinterested shareholder exemption under Rule 14A2(b)(1) to exempt shareholders engaging in collective action for the purpose of
nominating director candidates pursuant to their issuer’s nominating
procedures from the notice and filing requirements of the federal proxy rules.
This change would remove the important existing impediment to nominating
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procedures that require a minimum number of shareholders to support or
second a nomination.
A major advantage of this proposal is that it enables shareholders and
issuers to experiment with a broader range of options for increasing
shareholder input into board composition. Rule 14a-11 was, after all, roughly
modeled on a proxy access procedure developed by shareholders.346 Absent
regulatory interference, issuers could develop a variety of alternative
procedures. Issuers could use the existing nominating committee to nominate
two candidates for each board position. This approach meets some of the
current objections to proxy access by enabling the nominating committee to
maintain control over director selection, control that addresses concerns over
director qualifications, conflicts of interest, and overall board composition,
while increasing the degree of shareholder choice. Another approach could
authorize corporations to increase board size to accommodate shareholdernominated candidates without displacing existing issuer nominees. This
approach would increase shareholder input without creating an active contest
that might displace sitting directors.
In experimenting with proxy access procedures, investors and issuers might
also look to the experiences of other common law countries.347 Australia and
Canada, for example, allow nominations by 5% shareholders without the
requirement of a minimum holding period.348 Australia also authorizes
nominations by groups of one hundred shareholders.349 Although caution is
necessary in importing the governance approaches of countries with different
corporate structures and ownership models, the experiences of these countries
cast doubt on the objections posed by critics of proxy access. Shareholder
candidates are rarely nominated and still less frequently elected. Rather than
inciting frequent contested elections, the Australian system, for example, is
346 See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text (discussing the AFSCME decision and the SEC’s
response).
347 Examining proxy access from a global perspective suggests the availability of alternative governance
rights that might substitute for increased nominating power as well. Shareholders in some common law
countries have the right to amend the corporation’s charter and the right to call an extraordinary shareholders
meeting at which they can take actions such as removing directors with whom they are dissatisfied. See
Jennifer Hill, Evolving ‘Rules of the Game’ in Corporate Governance Reform, 1 INT’L J. CORP. GOVERNANCE
28 (2008).
348 Letter from Michael O’Sullivan, President, Austl. Council of Super Investors, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, SEC 1 (Aug. 14, 2009) [hereinafter O’Sullivan Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s710-09/s71009-195.pdf; Robert McDermott & Sean Farrell, Canada, GLOBAL CORP. GOVERNANCE GUIDE
2004, http://www.globalcorporategovernance.com/n_namericas/134_140.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
349 O’Sullivan Letter, supra note 348, at 1.
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said to promote the peaceful transition of directors in whom investors have lost
confidence.350
An alternative approach would provide minority shareholder groups of
sufficient size with the right not merely to nominate director candidates but to
secure board representation. Under the voting list approach taken by Italy and
Spain, for example, minority shareholders can propose a list of shareholder
nominees that competes with the official list of candidates and ensure that at
least one of their representatives obtains a director seat.351 One commentator
reports that the system, which has been in effect in Italy since 2006, has
worked “smoothly” and has affected the board composition of listed
companies.352
Another option is shareholder participation on the issuer’s nominating
committee. In Sweden, the nominating committee consists of shareholders
rather than directors.353 The Swedish shareholder nominating committee
approach has recently been publicized by the Centre for Tomorrow’s
Company, a think tank that had urged United Kingdom corporations to adopt a
similar structure for selecting directors.354 A variation on this approach might
be a nominating committee jointly comprised of shareholders and independent
directors.
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the relative
costs and benefits of these and other alternatives. The point is that the
corporate structure contains a variety of methods and mechanisms for
increasing shareholder input into the selection of directors. In the absence of
empirical or normative justification for the SEC’s chosen approach, it is
imprudent to prevent states and issuers from considering these alternatives.
350

Id.
Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in Directors’ Elections: A Revolution in the Making
35–36 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 147/2010, 2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1558467. See generally Matteo Erede et al., Italy’s ‘Vote by Slate’—An Innovative Method
to Elect Minority Directors, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK 2009 YEARBOOK 54
(Kevin Eddy ed., 2009), available at http://www.icgn.org/files/icgn_main/pdfs/year_books/icgn_yearbook_
2009.pdf (describing list voting in Italy); Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated Ownership
Structure: Can Hedge Funds Activism Play Any Role in Italy? 20–24 (Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397562 (describing Italian law provisions protecting rights of minority
shareholders).
352 Ventoruzzo, supra note 351, at 36.
353 See TOMORROW’S CO., TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BRIDGING THE UK ENGAGEMENT
GAP THROUGH SWEDISH-STYLE NOMINATION COMMITTEES 3 (2010) (describing the Swedish system),
available at http://www.forceforgood.com/Uploaded_Content/tool/243201011485875.pdf.
354 Id. at 9, 42–43, 45, 47.
351
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The amendments proposed by this Article might not result in effective
shareholder nominating rights. Issuers might respond by adopting bylaw
provisions that impose procedural requirements, director qualifications, filing
deadlines, or conditions for nominating shareholders that are impossible to
meet. Indeed, private ordering may lead to more limited nominating rights than
those the SEC attempted to provide through Rule 14a-11. Critically, however,
regulating shareholder nominating rights as a component of corporate
governance offers a variety of fail-safes and counterbalances that limit
potential managerial overreaching in the way that a restrictive federal rule does
not. As we have seen in recent years, private ordering and state regulation have
enabled corporate governance mechanisms to adapt to firm and market
developments. Innovations, such as majority voting and firm-specific
modifications like the elimination of staggered boards, shift the balance of
power between shareholders and management. In the current environment, the
pump is primed for reform of nominating procedures. The SEC just has to get
out of the way.
CONCLUSION
There was no need for the SEC to try to determine the optimal level of
shareholder nominating power. The area would have been free for state law
and issuer-specific experimentation if the SEC had simply held seventy years
ago that issuers were required to disclose the existence of all properly
nominated director candidates on the issuer’s proxy statement and to provide
shareholders with a chance to vote on the election of such candidates. Instead,
the SEC viewed its responsibility with respect to proxy access too broadly. The
SEC’s expertise with respect to market regulation, disclosure, and investor
protection does not translate into expertise over corporate governance. Nothing
in the SEC’s structure, composition, or experience indicates that it is better
positioned than state legislatures, state courts, and corporations themselves to
determine who should sit on corporate boards or to allocate power between
shareholders and managers to decide this question.355
355 See Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Propose Amendments Regarding
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spch052009tap.htm (“The Commission is not well-positioned to decide ‘who is in’ and ‘who is out.’”).
Whether Congress can or should make those determinations is a separate matter. Since the adoption of
Sarbanes–Oxley, Congress has made increasing, albeit cautious, inroads into the type of policy determinations
over corporate law and governance that previously had been left exclusively to state law and, to an extent,
private ordering. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REG., Spring
2003, at 26, 26, 28 (describing the increasing federal control of corporate law). Dodd–Frank provides
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The SEC’s adoption of a proxy access rule in 2010 was misguided. Market
and legal developments had reduced the need for a mandated form of proxy
access, and the SEC’s rule was so narrow and restrictive that it was unlikely to
enhance shareholder nominating power. At the same time, the SEC’s attempt
to funnel shareholder nominating efforts through the federal procedure would
likely have frustrated experimentation with more effective alternatives. In
adopting Rule 14a-11, the SEC acted as corporate governance czar—
displacing existing state law governance mechanisms in order to decide how
much governance power shareholders should enjoy.
In responding to the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the SEC should reconsider a
regulatory approach that continues to impede shareholder efforts to impose
accountability on corporate boards. Specifically, the SEC should modify its
proxy rules to facilitate shareholder choice about nomination procedures. This
Article has identified minor amendments to the federal proxy rules that would
reduce federal interference with private ordering. Although issuer-specific
experimentation may not produce the perfect proxy access procedure, it—
unlike the SEC’s regulatory process—is likely to produce experiential data
that, at a minimum, can facilitate more informed governance choices. In the
absence of federal interference, issuers, state legislatures and courts, and
investors themselves can respond to that experience.

fragments of the most aggressive federalization of corporate law to date with its inclusion of provisions
concerning shareholder approval of executive compensation, the composition of compensation committees, the
separation of the positions of CEO and chairman of the board, and the promulgation of self-regulatory
organization standards specifying director duties. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 763(a), 951, 972, 124 Stat.
1778, 1899, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78n (Supp. IV 2010)). To date, however,
the federalization remains largely a piecemeal effort. With the limited exception of Say on Pay, see supra note
270, which is, in any case, a nonbinding advisory vote, Dodd–Frank does not modify the substantive issues
upon which shareholders can vote or the procedures by which they exercise that voting power.

